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GENETIC PREDICTIONS OF  
FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS: IS THERE A 
BLUEPRINT FOR VIOLENCE? 
ERICA BEECHER-MONAS* AND EDGAR GARCIA-RILL** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The brave new world of genomics, spurred on by the Human Genome Pro-
ject, presents tantalizing possibilities for developments in criminal law as well as 
advances in medicine and understanding disease.  DNA identification testing 
has become commonplace in the courts, transforming the criminal justice sys-
tem, demonstrating innocence, and identifying perpetrators.  Already it is clear 
that DNA testing will be used as a way of predicting which medical treatments 
will be effective.  With predictive medicine becoming a reality, surely predicting 
human behavior cannot be far behind. 
The link between crime and genetics is hardly a new idea.  Since at least the 
late nineteenth century, courts and prisons have reflected attempts to discrimi-
nate between the innately criminal and those who acted merely by force of cir-
cumstance, whose crimes would not pose a future danger to society.1  To aid this 
distinction, predictions of future dangerousness became vital to the criminal jus-
tice system.  This legacy has persisted despite the enactment of civil rights legis-
lation that did away with the more overtly racist laws derived from eugenics.  
As a result, predictions of future dangerousness now dominate death penalty 
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 1. Cesare Lombroso, an influential criminologist, claimed that criminals were atavistic throwbacks 
to the apes, characterized by physical stigmata, as well as a high threshold for pain, an inability to blush, 
and a propensity for tattoos.  CESARE LOMBROSO, CRIME: ITS CAUSES AND REMEDIES 365 (Henry P. 
Horton trans., 1918).  See also STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 153–72 (1996) (discuss-
ing Lombroso’s influence on criminal law and the fallacy of his claims to predict innate criminality).  
According to Lombroso, although dangerous criminals should be removed from society, little would be 
gained by incarcerating victims of circumstance, including men who kill their adulterous wives in the 
heat of passion.  LOMBROSO, supra, at 138. 
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sentencing determinations and the commitment proceedings of sexually violent 
predators.2 
Surprisingly, although the stakes are high for their subjects, the predictions 
receive little judicial or legislative scrutiny.  Courts and legislatures are well 
aware of the unscientific nature of these predictions; nonetheless, they continue 
to demand them.3  Responding to this continued demand, researchers have at-
tempted to improve the accuracy of their predictions of future dangerousness 
by developing actuarial instruments to assess the risk of repeated violence in of-
fenders and psychiatric patients by examining a number of factors, scored on a 
scale with points varying according to the particular instrument.4  Each instru-
ment evaluates different risk factors, and scores each differently.  No one 
method is particularly predictive; 5 but the general consensus is that such instru-
ments are superior to clinical judgment alone.6  Whether future dangerousness 
predictions can meet standards of scientific validity, and what, if anything, can 
be done to improve them, are highly debatable issues.7  The question posed by 
behavioral genetics is whether molecular biology can improve this record. 
Genetic information, including behavioral genetics, has exploded under the 
influence of the Human Genome Project.8  Virtually everyone agrees that genes 
 
 2. Lest one think that racism and bigotry have disappeared from predictions of future dangerous-
ness, it is worth noting that “whites are more likely to view African American defendants as dangerous 
and violent than they [are likely to] view white defendants.”  Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the 
Real World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 876 
(2003). 
 3. See Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The “Fit” of Expert Predictions in Civil Commit-
ments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2–3 (2003) (commenting that courts are extraordinarily receptive to expert 
future dangerousness testimony, even though they are well aware of its scientific unreliability). 
 4. Actuarial risk assessment “uses an equation, a formula, a graph, or an actuarial table to arrive 
at a probability, or expected value, of some outcome.”  William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Compara-
tive Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Predic-
tion Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 294 (1996). 
 5. See, e.g., Neil M. Malamuth et al., Risk Assessment: Discussion of the Section, in 1989 ANNALS 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI., SEXUALLY COERCIVE BEHAVIOR: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGEMENT 236, 237 
(Robert A. Prentky et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter SEXUALLY COERCIVE BEHAVIOR] (explaining that 
at best, current actuarial instruments are only moderately predictive, having “Receiver Operating 
Characteristic” curve statistics of about 0.70, or correlations of 0.30).  Even with the best assessment 
instrument, the VRAG, only 55% of the individuals scoring as high risks actually recidivated compared 
with 19% recidivism in the low scoring group.  See John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific 
Validity and Evidentiary Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 906–08 (2000). 
 6. For a more in-depth examination and appraisal of each of these instruments, see generally Er-
ica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Chaos at the Edge of Danger: Predicting Violent Behavior in a 
Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845 (2003).  The current article retraces much of the dis-
cussion in Chaos, expanding on the danger of using behavioral genetics research and its findings to pre-
dict future dangerous behavior, including the threat to the moral authority of law. 
 7. See, e.g., Caroline M. Mee & Harold V. Hall, Risky Business: Assessing Danger in Hawai’i, 24 
U. HAW. L. REV. 63, 63 (2001) (“[D]angerousness prediction has heretofore been rudimentary and in-
accurate, relying on clinical judgment rather than on objective measures.”).  Even when actuarial risk 
assessment is used, the results, while better than clinical predictions, are only moderately predictive.  
See, e.g., Malamuth et al., supra note 5. 
 8. The Human Genome Project refers to the international, thirteen-year research that sought to 
identify and determine the sequences of the genes and base-pairs making up human DNA.  See, e.g., 
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influence behavior.9  Scandinavian studies of adopted twins are widely touted as 
supporting the role of genes in crime.10  That the cycle of violence is repeated 
across generations is common knowledge.11  Recently, alleles of specific genes, 
like those transcribing for monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), have been identi-
fied and linked with propensities to violence.12  Should adding genetic informa-
tion to the mix not produce more accurate predictions of future dangerousness? 
This question must be answered with a qualified yes and no.  First, there is 
unfortunate history in this regard, and while we might wish to put the bad old 
days behind us, the shocking absence of scientific scrutiny for eugenics asser-
tions has managed to persist in the astonishing failure of courts and legislatures 
to examine the scientific validity of expert future dangerousness predictions.13  
Throwing away the key when someone has committed a grisly crime is an all-
too-human response to the specter of tragedy and nasty headlines.  But it is pre-
cisely to counter such responses that we have the rule of law.  Inquiry into the 
relevance and reliability of proffered evidence is a foundational aspect of this 
process. 
 
Human Genome Project Information, http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/ 
project/hgl.shtml (last visited Feb. 4, 2006).  The completed human genome sequence is estimated to 
consist of 20,000 to 25,000 protein-coding genes.  See International Human Genome Sequencing Con-
sortium, Finishing the Euchromatic Sequence of the Human Genome, 431 NATURE 931 (2004) (report-
ing the results of the project). 
 9. See, e.g., Richard P. Ebstein et al., Behavioral Genetics, Genomics, and Personality, in 
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS IN THE POSTGENOMIC ERA 365, 380 (Robert Plomin et al. eds., 2003) (“[T]he 
importance of genetic factors in determining human temperament has been recognized for two dec-
ades.”); Patrick Bateson, The Corpse of a Wearisome Debate, 297 SCIENCE 2212, 2212 (2002) (reviewing 
STEPHEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE (2002)) (“[T]he 
center of th[e] academic debate is not about whether genes influence behavior but rather how they do 
so.”). 
 10. See, e.g., DEBRA NIEHOFF, THE BIOLOGY OF VIOLENCE: HOW UNDERSTANDING THE BRAIN, 
BEHAVIOR, AND ENVIRONMENT CAN BREAK THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF AGGRESSION 238 (1999) 
(“[T]win and adoption data favor a role for genetic influences [in crime]. . . .  [W]hen concordance rates 
for violent crime were extracted from the Scandinavian data, none of the studies made a very convinc-
ing case for an appreciable genetic influence on violence.”); MATT RIDLEY, THE AGILE GENE 19–20 
(2004) (noting that twin studies demonstrate that “personality is about as heritable as body weight.”). 
 11. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE REVISITED (1996), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/cyclepre.pdf (studying 1575 subjects over a twenty-six-year period, and 
concluding that abused and neglected children were twice as likely to be arrested as juveniles as chil-
dren without such a history, and more likely to be arrested for a violent offense). 
 12. MAOA regulates neurotransmitters such as serotonin, dopamine, and epinephrine, and has 
been associated with psychopathy, childhood hyperactivity, childhood aggression, impulsivity, and sub-
stance abuse.  See Grant T. Harris et al., The Construct of Psychopathy, 28 CRIME & JUST. 197, 224 
(2001) (“[F]indings on all of these laboratory-based theories of psychopathy often seem somewhat 
ephemeral.”).  See also Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated 
Children, 297 SCIENCE 851, 851–53 (2002) (studying 442 men in New Zealand for differences in MAOA 
activity alleles and correlating these differences with maltreatment in childhood and subsequent violent 
behavior).  The results demonstrated that the high activity form of the gene did not manifest in violent 
propensities even if the men had been mistreated as boys, while those with the low-active form of the 
gene who had been mistreated committed four times as many rapes, assaults, and robberies as the aver-
age.  Id. 
 13. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness Testi-
mony and Intellectual Due Process, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 359 (2003) (discussing the courts’ 
failure to examine the scientific validity of future dangerousness testimony). 
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Second, although information from the biology of violence, including ge-
nomics, could vastly improve the way predictions are made, such information 
must be tested, scrutinized, and properly limited so that the promise of science 
is not once again perverted into the cynicism of political expediency.  This leads 
to the third point: Although genes may constrain or influence behavior, they do 
so only in concert with each other and with the environment both internal and 
external to the organism carrying the genes. 
Initially, future dangerousness predictions were based on mostly wrong and 
mostly unchallenged notions of heredity14 and acted upon mostly in such “pre-
ventive” measures as mass sterilizations,15 indeterminate sentencing, and ethni-
cally biased immigration laws.16  Because genes were considered strictly deter-
ministic, these hereditarian notions of crime control were coupled with the idea 
of diminished responsibility.17  Thus, at the same time legislatures were enacting 
these preventive crime control measures, Clarence Darrow managed to save his 
clients Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb from the death penalty by arguing 
that they were the “product of heredity.”18  These twin themes linking genetics 
to crime prevention and exoneration have resurfaced with the massive attention 
drawn to the Human Genome Project.  Behavioral genetics has been heralded 
as the future of criminal justice.19 
 
 14. They were also based on fallacious notions about genetic differences among ethnic groups.  See, 
e.g., John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, On the Universality of Human Nature and the Uniqueness of the 
Individual: The Role of Genetics and Adaptation, 58 J. PERSONALITY 1, 34–35 (1990), in which the au-
thors explain that modern molecular genetics have shown no basis for believing that “each ethnic group 
has a set of genes shared by members of the group, but not shared by others.”  Rather, the genetic dif-
ference between individuals of the same ethnic group is much larger than the genetic difference be-
tween groups: “within-group variance is 12 times greater than the between-group variance.”  From an 
evolutionary standpoint, this is consistent with the pathogen theory of sexual recombination: because 
people “catch diseases from their neighbors . . . it is important to be genetically different from them; 
such selection . . . promot[es] local within-group diversity and reduc[es] intergroup diversity. . . . Al-
though there is a sea of genetic diversity (measured at the protein level), it is a well-mixed sea.”  Id. 
 15. See, e.g., Charles C. Mann, Behavioral Genetics in Transition, 264 SCIENCE 1686, 1686 (1994) 
(“By 1930, 24 states had enacted laws to sterilize the ‘feeble-minded,’” who were believed to be respon-
sible for a degenerate society and the crime that was rampant within it). 
 16. See id. at 1686 (noting that Calvin Coolidge signed the Immigration Restriction Act in 1924, 
aimed at protecting the United States from “supposedly inferior Latin and Slavic genes”); see also Mi-
chael Willrich, The Two Percent Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the Socialization of American 
Law, 1900-1930, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 63, 84 (1998) (remarking on the “link between heredity, fee-
blemindedness and criminality” as the focus of prison and mental institution reformers in the early part 
of the twentieth century). 
 17. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective 
on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2003) (discussing the 
influence of Darwinism on criminal theory). 
 18. CLARENCE DARROW, The Crime of Compulsion, Address of Case Summation Before John R. 
Caverly, Chief Justice of the Criminal Court of Cook County (Aug. 22, 1924), in ATTORNEY FOR THE 
DAMNED: CLARENCE DARROW IN THE COURTROOM 65–66 (Arthur Weinberg ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 
1989) (1957). 
 19. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Predicting and Punishing Antisocial Acts: How the Criminal Justice 
System Might Use Behavioral Genetics, in BEHAVIORAL GENETICS: THE CLASH OF CULTURE AND 
BIOLOGY 134–35 (Ronald A. Carson & Mark A. Rothstein eds., 1999) (suggesting that in the future, 
the state might consider genes “thought to be associated with precursors to criminal behavior”); David 
11__BEECHER-MONAS.DOC 9/8/2006  3:55 PM 
Winter/Spring 2006] GENETIC PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 305 
The questions now facing social policymakers are whether and how to use 
these scientific advances so as to avoid the pitfalls of eugenics.  Involuntary ster-
ilization statutes may have been repealed,20 determinate sentencing guidelines 
may have imposed some uniformity on punishment,21 and immigration laws may 
no longer retain ethnically biased language; nonetheless, the criminal justice 
system’s reliance on future dangerousness predictions has increased dramati-
cally, and without scientific scrutiny.  Future dangerousness predictions are re-
quired in a wide range of proceedings, including civil commitments, juvenile ad-
judications, bail hearings, competency hearings, insanity determinations, and 
sentencing, yet “dangerousness prediction has heretofore been rudimentary and 
inaccurate, relying on clinical judgment rather than on objective measures.”22 
 
Wasserman, Is There Value in Identifying Individual Genetic Predispositions to Violence?, 32 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 24, 24 (2004) (forecasting the expanded use of behavioral genetics in crime control); Lindsy 
A. Elkins, Note, Five-Foot Two With Eyes of Blue: Physical Profiling and the Prospect of a Genetics-
Based Criminal Justice System, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 269, 271 (2003) (“DNA 
analysis could serve as an antidote to racial profiling [and could explore the] broader implications of 
using genetic research.”); Rhonda J. Yen, Tourette’s Syndrome: A Case Example for Mandatory Genetic 
Regulation of Behavioral Disorders, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 29 (“[T]he vision of Gattaca [a 1997 
movie depicting a society driven by genetic engineering] is closer than many of us realize.”); Kathy 
Hudson, Keynote Address, The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the Law: The American Le-
gal System’s Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 431, 443–44 (2002) (fore-
casting changes when behavioral genetics enters into the criminal justice system in terms of defenses 
and predisposition to commit crime); Nicole Hahn Rafter, Seeing and Believing: Images of Heredity in 
Biological Theories of Crime, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 71, 98 (2001) (“Pop criminologists may soon come up 
with recommendations for genetic engineering.”); Jasmine A. Tehrani & Sarnoff A. Mednick, Genetic 
Factors and Criminal Behavior, 64 FED. PROBATION 24, 26 (2000) (“[C]rime prevention efforts may be 
most effective when all risk factors, social and genetic, are evaluated.”); Nikolas Rose, The Biology of 
Culpability, Pathological Identification and Crime Control in a Biological Culture, 4 THEORETICAL 
CRIMINOLOGY 5 (2000); Bettyann Kevles & Daniel J. Kevles, Scapegoat Biology: As Violence Contin-
ues to Ravage Our Society, Researchers are Raising Hopes that Science Alone Can Save Us From Our 
Worst Natures—Again, DISCOVER, Oct. 1997, at 58, 59-60 (“Crime joins . . . many aspects of human life 
for which it can be claimed that biology is destiny.”). 
 20. The Virginia statute allowing forced sterilization of “mental defectives,” upheld in Buck v. Bell, 
274 U.S. 200 (1927), was repealed in 1974.  1974 Va. Acts ch. 296.  However, a voluntary sterilization 
statute mandating castration as a condition of parole for repeat sex offenders was enacted in California 
in 1996.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 2005).  Florida, Georgia, and Montana have similar statutes.  
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.0235 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-9-44.2 (West 1997); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 45-5-512 (1997). 
 21. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (ruling that sentencing guidelines must be 
merely discretionary).  However, the post-Booker consequences for determinate sentencing are any-
body’s guess. 
 22. Mee & Hall, supra note 7, at 63.  Indeed, predictions of future dangerousness (on which the 
death penalty, sex offender registration and post-sentence commitment, to name just a few, are based) 
have become pervasive in the criminal justice system.  For example, Deborah Denno ascribes the 
“dramatic surge in sexual psychopath legislation” to the “medicalization of deviance.”  Deborah 
Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1317, 1320 (1998).  It is not a 
far leap from “medicalization” to assuming a genetic basis for sexually deviant behavior.  See Lori B. 
Andrews, Predicting and Punishing Antisocial Acts, in BEHAVIORAL GENETICS: THE CLASH OF 
CULTURE AND BIOLOGY 116, 134 (Ronald A. Carson & Mark A. Rothstein eds., 1999) (noting that 
because racial prejudice affects surveillance, arrests, and sentencing, “it is often taken for granted that 
[blacks’] higher representation in arrests and in prison means they are more violence prone” without 
acknowledging the skewed sampling).  For example, Professor Andrews points out that “[p]regnant 
white women are slightly more likely to abuse drugs than pregnant black women, but pregnant black 
women are 9.58 times as likely to be reported for substance abuse during pregnancy.”  Id. 
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On the other hand, apart from Clarence Darrow’s clients, defendants who 
have attempted to use the idea of innate propensities to negate individual re-
sponsibility have met with great resistance.  Unless the accused independently 
meets the criteria for legal insanity, criminal defenses built on behavioral genet-
ics have been overwhelmingly defeated.23  Putting aside for a moment the ques-
tion whether the courts were correct about the poor science behind these asser-
tions denying culpability due to genetic predispositions, it appears odd, as a 
practical matter, that the same courts rely on predictions of dangerousness that 
are even less scientific. 
Part II of this article discusses and critiques the courts’ use of future danger-
ousness predictions in sentencing and post-sentence commitment proceedings 
for capital murderers and sex offenders and in community notification require-
ments for sex offenders.  Part III addresses the growth of knowledge about the 
biology of violence and sexual violence, and questions whether such informa-
tion could be incorporated into actuarial instruments that might more reliably 
form the basis for sentencing and post-sentencing determinations.  Part IV ex-
amines the problems of predicting violence based on genetic information.  Part 
V concludes that the courts’ insistence on future dangerousness predictions is 
ill-conceived for both legal and scientific reasons.  Nevertheless, in the face of 
their unwillingness to abandon such predictions, the courts must at a minimum 
insist on the most accurate information available, and that information includes 
the role of genes in the biology of violence. 
II 
FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS IN THE COURTS 
Predictions of future dangerousness are widely admissible without any judi-
cial inquiry into their scientific validity.24  This is astonishing in a system that 
embraces the tenet that only facts having rational probative value should be 
 
 23. As soon as studies linking XYY chromosomal abnormalities with criminal propensities became 
available, defense attorneys argued that their clients should be exonerated.  In the United States, the 
four cases that attempted such a genetic defense were unsuccessful.  See State v. Roberts, 544 P.2d 754 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (affirming trial court’s denial of genetic testing because of the uncertain causal 
connection between XYY and criminal conduct); People v. Yukl, 372 N.Y.S.2d 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) 
(refusing to order genetic testing or to permit the defendant’s father to pay for genetic testing because 
the evidence of a genetic link to violence was not reliably established); People v. Tanner, 91 Cal. Rptr. 
656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (finding that neither the link to aggressive behavior nor a chromosomal con-
tribution to legal insanity were established); Millard v. State, 261 A.2d 227 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) 
(upholding trial court’s refusal to submit the genetic issue to the jury because the expert failed to dem-
onstrate a link between the XYY condition and the legal definition of insanity).  An attempt to obtain 
expert testimony to mitigate the sentence of a capital murder defendant on the basis of MAOA gene 
abnormality has also been unsuccessful.  See Turpin v. Mobley, 502 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. 1998) (finding no 
ineffective assistance of counsel in rejecting defendant’s father’s offer to pay for genetic testing for 
MAOA deficiency analysis after the trial court refused to pay for it). 
 24. See Scherr, supra note 3. 
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admissible in the search for truth.25  Yet judges continue to admit predictions 
that no one seriously argues can meet these standards.  If the test by which an 
evidentiary practice should be judged is whether it increases the likelihood that 
the truth, defined as correspondence to the real world, will be attained, expert 
future dangerousness testimony fails to make the grade.26 
Basic rule of law precepts appear to be tossed out with the bathwater when 
it comes to gruesome murders and violent sex offenses.  People deemed to be at 
risk for sexually violent recidivism are not only singled out for involuntary post-
sentence commitment, community registration, or lifetime parole, but the de-
termination of their guilt for sexual offenses can be based on evidence of past 
crimes, which would be impermissible “character evidence” for other felony de-
fendants.27  The justification for this disparate treatment is that sex crimes are 
different from other crimes of violence and that sex offenders are more incorri-
gible and less likely to be deterred by the threat of incarceration.28  In sentenc-
 
 25. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402 & 403 (requiring both relevance and probativity in order for evi-
dence to be admissible). 
 26. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 6, at 1856–60 (explaining that clinical future danger-
ousness testimony cannot meet the standards of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 
579 (1993), and Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 140 (1997), because it is entirely subjective, un-
grounded in empirical data, and therefore unfalsifiable; has been overwhelmingly castigated by the pro-
fession, and thus fails peer review, publication, and general acceptance; has no standards for its meth-
odology; and cannot meet the requirements for an acceptable error rate).  We are not, as Professor 
Scherr contends, seeking a “bare relevance” standard.  See Scherr, supra note 3, at 3 (arguing that be-
cause future dangerousness testimony fills a perceived need of the courts it is justified under Daubert’s 
“fit” requirement).  Rather, we contend that with respect to expert testimony, relevance under Daubert 
and rule of law principles consists of two prongs: reliability (scientific validity); and a logical tendency 
to prove or disprove an issue in the case.  Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 6.  Sometimes the 
concept of “fit” is called “materiality,” but it is considered to be one of the generative principles of the 
law of evidence.  See Robert P. Burns, Notes on the Future of Evidence Law, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 69, 70 
(2001) (noting that the generative principle of materiality, now subsumed under the relevance require-
ment, permits into evidence only evidence of consequence to the “legitimate determination of the ac-
tion”).  Contrary to the Court’s contention in Barefoot v. Estelle, the adversary process cannot be 
trusted “to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness.”  
463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983).  Rather, as the Supreme Court explained in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc., the requirement that expert testimony be helpful to the jury, “supported by appropriate 
validation—that is, ‘good grounds,’ based upon what is known,” is a condition of relevance.  509 U.S. 
579, 590–91 (1993).  And relevance is not “merely” a matter of evidentiary rules; it is a constitutional 
minimum, “a requirement of due process and a fundamental fairness requirement of the rule of law.”  
Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness Testimony and Intellec-
tual Due Process, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 353, 361 (2003). 
 27. Compare FED. R. EVID. 413 (stating evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault cases is admis-
sible) and FED. R. EVID. 414 (permitting evidence of similar crimes in molestation cases) (enacted by 
Congress as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994; effective July 9, 
1995) with FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”). 
 28. There is little evidence for this, however, and Congress cited none in passing the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.  For example, in Seling v. Young, regarding a post-
sentence, sexual offender commitment, the Supreme Court held that even when confinement condi-
tions raised serious concern, release from commitment is unavailable.  531 U.S. 250 (2001).  The Court 
rejected ex post facto and double jeopardy claims, although it left open the possibility that due process 
claims might be available.  Id. at 263.  Eric Janus argues that the constitutionality of sexual predator 
commitments is premised on that of only the most dangerous, a premise that is “dubious because of the 
limitations in our ability to predict dangerousness.”  Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora’s Box: Sexual 
Predators and the Politics of Sexual Violence, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233, 1237 (2004).  Professor 
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ing sex offenders and capital murderers, as well as in the post-sentencing dispo-
sition of sex offenders, predictions of future dangerousness are rampant, al-
though generations of scientists have explained that such predictions cannot 
meet the standards of science.  As argued elsewhere,29 this is a far cry from the 
truth-generating methodologies supposedly fundamental to due process, and 
the movement away from requiring a modicum of credibility is counter to what 
goes on in civil trials, in which experts must demonstrate the reliability of their 
testimony.30 
Predicting future dangerousness has become important as the criminal jus-
tice system has changed its focus from punishment to preventing violent recidi-
vism.31  Although “most offenders have only one recorded violent offense”32 and 
only a small proportion of criminal offenses are violent, the focus of criminal 
justice has shifted from punishment to deterrence through incarceration, civil 
commitment, or death.33  For specific sexual offenders, not only are sentences 
vastly increased for second and third offenses, but sexually violent predator 
statutes provide for indefinite post-sentence civil commitment.34  These stat-
utes—as well as sexual offender registration laws, three-strikes laws, which au-
thorize life sentences for repeat offenders, and laws that lower the age at which 
juveniles may be tried as adults—are all based on the notion of preventing fu-
ture crimes.35 
 
Janus considers the other bases for finding these commitments constitutional—that somehow this small 
group of offenders is “different” from normal people because they are mentally disordered, and that 
confinement would be only for the period of treatment—equally flawed.  Id. at 1236. 
 29. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 6. 
 30. See, e.g., Julie G. Shoop, Judges are Gaining Confidence in Assessing Expert Evidence, Study 
Finds, 38 TRIAL 92, 92 (2002) (reporting findings by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice that Daubert 
has had a significant impact on the admissibility of expert testimony in civil trials: judges’ close scrutiny 
of relevance and reliability has resulted in a dramatic increase in the percentage of expert testimony 
excluded in products liability trials and in a consequential surge in summary judgments against the 
plaintiffs).  This increased scrutiny of scientific evidence has not affected criminal trials nearly so dra-
matically.  See, e.g., Paul C. Gianelli, Scientific Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
103, 119 (2001) (discussing myriad instances in which criminal judges fail to take Daubert seriously); Er-
ica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. 
L. REV. 55, 78–82 (1998). 
 31. See Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 62 (2003) 
(“Preventive detention is a pervasive, routine occurrence in our society.”); cf. Stephen J. Morse, Pre-
ventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56, 56 (2004) (“[P]ure preventive 
detention is more common than we usually assume, but . . . this practice violates fundamental assump-
tions concerning liberty under the American constitutional regime.”). 
 32. David P. Farrington, Predictors, Causes, and Correlates of Male Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & 
JUST. 421, 434 (1998) (citing studies). 
 33. Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal Jus-
tice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1450 n.77 (2001) (noting the shift to preventing future violations and ob-
serving that most felony offenders are not convicted of a subsequent offense). 
 34. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-900 (2005). 
 35. See Robinson, supra note 33, at 1432 (arguing this approach perverts the justice system).  In 
addition to three-strikes laws, a number of states have enacted two-strikes laws with enhanced sen-
tences for violent sexual offenders.  See Roxane Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 
CRIME & JUST. 43, 70 (1998) (observing a “trend toward sentences that incapacitate offenders” and 
noting increased sentences for sex offenders).  Experts estimate that two-thirds of offenders affected by 
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In capital sentencing, for example, Texas requires the jury to decide 
“whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts 
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”36  Similarly, the 
Virginia sentencing guidelines use a sex offender risk assessment instrument to 
recommend that judges consider increased sentences; for nearly half of all sex 
offenders, this results in a modification upwards.37  For the top scorers, it can re-
sult in trebled sentences.38 
Sexually violent predator statutes similarly rely on predictions of danger-
ousness to extend confinement, even beyond terms served.39  Legislatures in six-
teen states and the District of Columbia have enacted sexually violent predator 
laws that civilly commit sexual offenders who have already served their criminal 
sentences to further indefinite incarceration.40  A common definition of a sexual 
 
the three-strikes law in California are non-violent offenders.  FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON 
HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 182 (1997). 
 36. TX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 1996).  Virginia also explicitly requires a find-
ing of future dangerousness in capital sentencing proceedings.  VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2–264.2–4 (2004).  
Even when jurors are not explicitly required to consider future dangerousness, studies of capital jurors 
have shown that “discussion of the defendant’s dangerousness occupies a large portion of the time ju-
rors spend deliberating on whether a death sentence is appropriate, regardless of how or whether this 
information is included at any point during the sentencing phase.”  Aletha M. Claussen-Schulz et al., 
Dangerousness, Risk Assessment, and Capital Sentencing, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 471, 480 
(2004). 
 37. The Virginia guidelines present the judge with “a midpoint recommendation” for each defen-
dant and a range of sentencing options, in which the high end is increased for the riskiest group of of-
fenders.  Richard P. Kern & Meredith Farrar-Owens, Sentencing Guidelines with Integrated Offender 
Risk Assessment, 16 FED. SENT. R. 165, 2004 WL 2189126, at *5.  The factors used for this instrument 
are: age at the time of conviction (paradoxically, you get a worse sentence for being young); prior his-
tory of sex offense arrests; criminal record; relationship with the victim; victim’s age; whether there was 
penetration (or attempted penetration); whether the defendant had received treatment; and education 
level.  Id.  There was apparently no testing of this instrument outside the Virginia Sentencing Commis-
sion, and it was neither peer-reviewed nor published in scientific journals before being implemented.  
Id.  Although two cases have challenged the use of the sex offender instrument, neither was successful.  
See Brooks v. Commonwealth, No. 2540-02-3, 2004 WL 136090 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2004) (upholding 
constitutionality of guidelines system because they were discretionary with the judge); Lutrell v. Vir-
ginia, No. 2092-02-4 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2004) (rejecting appeal based on unreliability of instrument 
because Virginia exempts from appeal judicial use of sentencing guidelines). 
 38. See Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 37, at *6 (noting that 48% of rapists and 41% of felony 
sex assault offenders received an upward modification, although only 3% of rapists and 2% of sexual 
assault offenders received the highest increase, which tripled their possible sentence). 
 39. Most state statutes concerning sexually violent predators require a finding of future dangerous-
ness, plus current mental illness.  See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (1990) (civil commitment 
proceedings require a determination of future danger and mental illness).  The Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of such indefinite post-sentence commitments in Kansas v. Hendricks, finding both 
that the civil commitment of sexual predators does not constitute punishment and that states may con-
fine individuals whose mental abnormality makes them likely to commit future offenses.  521 U.S. 346, 
346–47 (1997). 
 40. These states include: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701–3717 (2003); California, 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–09.3 (West 1998 & Supp. 2005); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
394.910–.931 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); Illinois, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1–99 (2002 & Supp. 2004); 
Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229A.1–.16 (West Supp. 2005); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (2004 
& Supp. 2005); Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2005); 
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (West 2003); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480 (West 
2000); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.24 (West Supp. 2005); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 426.005 
(1998); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-10 (1998); Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
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predator is someone who has committed a crime of sexual violence and has a 
mental or personality disorder that makes future acts of sexual violence likely.41  
Although definitions of sexual predator may vary by statute, they all require 
findings that future acts of sexual violence are likely.42  Clinical predictions 
alone, or in combination with actuarial risk assessment instruments, have been 
widely accepted as adequately reliable for the severe deprivations of liberty au-
thorized by the violent sexual predator statutes.43 
Community notification statutes, the first of which was Megan’s Law, are 
also based on predicting the dangerousness of sex offenders.44  Selective com-
munity notification is now commonplace for released sex offenders.  In New 
Jersey, and most other states, offenders are scaled on a risk assessment instru-
ment and entitled to a hearing to evaluate their dangerousness.45  If the offend-
ers are deemed to be a danger to the community, they must register information 
such as their address with a sexual offender registry that is accessible by the 
public, leading to dire consequences for their ability to obtain housing, em-
ployment, and other resources. 
While future dangerousness is often explicitly a factor in determining the 
sentence for violent murders and sex offenses, some courts are predicting future 
criminality even for nonviolent offenders.  In Virginia, for example, two kinds 
 
ANN. §§ 841.001–.002 (Vernon 1999); Virginia, VA. CODE. ANN. § 37.2-900 (2005); Washington, WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 980.01 (1998). 
 41. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2004 & Supp. 2005).  Some states, like Minnesota, re-
quire that the victim be a stranger, which virtually guarantees that the most prevalent, and arguably the 
most devastating, form of sexual offense—that which occurs within the family—remains unaddressed.  
See, e.g., Eric S. Janus, Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an Empirically-Based 
Prevention Policy be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1083, 1087 (2003) (“[T]he over-
whelming majority of sexual crimes . . . [are] committed by acquaintances and intimates of the vic-
tims.”). 
 42. See John M. Fabian, Examining Our Approach to Sex Offenders & the Law, Kansas v. 
Hendricks, Crane and Beyond: “Mental Abnormality,” and “Sexual Dangerousness”: Volitional vs. 
Emotional Abnormality and the Debate Between Community Safety and Civil Liberties, 29 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2003) (“The term ‘sexual predator’ [is] usually applied to offenders who 
offend against strangers, have multiple victims, have prior sexual offenses, are sexually deviant and suf-
fer from paraphilias such as pedophilia, commit violent offenses, and may have exhibited other antiso-
cial and criminal behaviors.”). 
 43. See, e.g., In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (upholding 
use of actuarial instruments to assess future dangerousness); Johnson v. Missouri, 2001 WL 527494 
(Mo. Ct. App. May 18, 2001) (finding that expert testimony was necessary to determine that a defen-
dant incarcerated since his teens had a mental abnormality that made him likely to commit sexual vio-
lence); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 n.15 (Minn. 1994) (giving broad deference to expert predic-
tions of future dangerousness); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 132 (Wis. 1995) (rejecting challenge 
based on impossibility of prediction). 
 44. The New Jersey legislature in 1994 adopted a series of measures under the name Megan’s Law, 
including extending prison terms, involuntary civil commitment, lifetime parole supervision, and man-
datory DNA sampling for identification.  N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C §§ 7-1–7-11 (West Supp. 2005).  The reg-
istration provisions require sex offender registration with law enforcement and community notification.  
Id. 
 45. In re Registrant G.B., 685 A.2d 1252, 1260–61 (N.J. 1996). 
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of risk assessment instruments are being used for sentencing determinations.46  
In addition to the violent offender instrument, the nonviolent offender risk as-
sessment instrument was developed in response to overcrowding of Virginia’s 
prisons and is used to determine who should receive a jail sentence and who 
could be placed on probation.47 
A. Gatekeeping Dilemmas 
In a trio of evidentiary cases, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,48 General Electric Company v. Joiner,49 and Kumho Tire Company v. Car-
michael,50 the Supreme Court demanded that judges examine the empirical 
foundations of expert assertions made in their courts to ensure that the underly-
ing data is sound.  These cases command that judges admit into evidence only 
expert testimony that passes scientific muster, testimony that at a minimum 
meets the standards and methods of science.51 
No such trustworthiness inquiry is compelled regarding expert testimony 
about the defendant’s future dangerousness,52 whether that testimony is pre-
sented in a capital sentencing hearing or in sexual offender commitment pro-
ceedings.  In capital sentencing, this relaxed evidentiary standard for expert tes-
timony is due, in large part, to the Supreme Court’s holding in Barefoot v. 
Estelle53 that expert testimony as to a defendant’s future dangerousness is consti-
tutional.  In sexual offender commitment proceedings, the lower standard rests 
on Kansas v. Hendricks,54 in which Court upheld a state statute that permitted 
indefinite commitments of sexual offenders based on future dangerousness tes-
 
 46. See Kern & Farrar-Owens, supra note 37, at *8 (“Virginia is the only structured sentencing 
guidelines system in the nation that has formally integrated offender risk assessment tools grounded in 
criminological research.”). 
 47. See Emily Bazelon, Sentencing by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 2, 2005, at 18–19 (dis-
cussing the Virginia sentencing program).  These tables are based on factors such as adult and juvenile 
criminal records, gender, age, employment, and marital status.  Id.  Judges use a 71-point scale of risk 
assessment employing these factors to aid in sentencing.  Id.  A score of 35 or less means the defendant 
is eligible for house arrest or probation.  Id.  If a defendant receives a score of 35 or more, the recom-
mendation is jail time.  Id.  The Virginia sentencing commission’s chair claims that in testing the scale 
on prisoners who had been released five years previously, the table was accurate in three out of four 
cases.  Id. 
 48. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 49. 522 U.S. 136, 140 (1997) (reiterating the trial judge’s mandate to review testimony for scientific 
validity and “fit”). 
 50. 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (extending the scope of the Daubert inquiry to technical evidence). 
 51. Notably, one-third of the prisoners exonerated by the Actual Innocence Project had been con-
victed on the basis of “tainted or fraudulent science.”  JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE 
DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000). 
 52. Cf. Morse, supra note 31, at 59 (“The incentive structure predisposes the gatekeepers in cases 
involving danger to over-predict.”). 
 53. 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (upholding the admissibility of expert testimony about future dangerous-
ness, even when stated in response to hypothetical questions based upon controverted facts).  Notably, 
no opinion in the Daubert trilogy referred to Barefoot.  Kumho, however, did castigate astrology as un-
scientific.  526 U.S. at 151. 
 54. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
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timony.  And in Kansas v. Crane,55 the Court revisited the Kansas Act, once 
more failing to address the problematic nature of expert future dangerousness 
testimony.56  None of these cases has required the trustworthiness demonstra-
tion that rule of law principles, the Daubert trio, and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence appear to require of expert testimony under any other circumstance.  
One is entitled to be cynical about such rules when sentences of death, incar-
ceration, and preventive detention can be based on predictions that the courts 
acknowledge to be scientifically flimsy. 
B. Gatekeeping under Daubert 
Explicitly addressing the Federal Rules of Evidence, Daubert held that sci-
entific validity and the “fit” of expert testimony to the facts in the case are ques-
tions of reliability and relevance.57  Four “general observations” guide the in-
quiry into scientific validity: (1) testability; (2) peer review and publication; (3) 
the existence of methodological standards, including the error rate of the meth-
odology; and (4) general acceptance.58  The overall goal of these flexible guide-
lines is to evaluate expert testimony by the standards scientists themselves use 
to critique each other’s work.59  In Joiner and Kumho, the Court subsequently 
reiterated the Daubert standards, expounding on its notion of “fit,” and explain-
ing that not only do judges have to evaluate the scientific validity of testimony 
based on the traditional “hard” sciences, but that they must also evaluate the 
validity of expert testimony based on what are often referred to as the “soft” 
sciences, such as psychology.60  Congress subsequently amended the Federal 
Rules of Evidence to codify these cases.61 
These changes in evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence have profoundly affected not only the federal courts, 
but state courts as well.62  Even jurisdictions that eschew the Daubert standard 
in favor of the “general acceptance” standard of Frye v. United States63 are be-
 
 55. 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
 56. Id. at 411–12.  In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court had relied on Hendricks’ testimony that the 
only way he could control his impulses to molest children was “to die.”  521 U.S. at 355.  Thus, Crane 
contended the state had to show an absence of control.  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding a show-
ing only of “serious difficulty in controlling dangerous behavior,” rather than a complete absence of 
control, was necessary to meet constitutional standards.  Crane, 534 U.S. at 408. 
 57. 509 U.S. 579, 590–91 (1993). 
 58. Id. at 593–94. 
 59. See id. at 580, 593 (characterizing the inquiry as a “flexible one”). 
 60. See id. at 137 (addressing issue of expert’s engineering testimony). 
 61. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 62. For an article describing some of these changes, see generally Clark Hedger, Note, Daubert 
and the States: A Critical Analysis of Emerging Trends, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 177 (2004) (describing state 
court reactions to Daubert and FED. R. EVID. 702). 
 63. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  For over seventy years, the only scientific evidence admissible in 
court was that which purported to reflect a consensus of the relevant scientific community.  This was 
the standard articulated in Frye, which explained that “while courts will go a long way in admitting ex-
pert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which 
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ginning to insist that expert testimony meet standards of scientific validity.64  
Thus, even in courts in which the Daubert standard is not followed, there is an 
increased awareness that whatever evidence is considered should be based on a 
sound empirical foundation.  Such awareness supports the argument that 
Daubert’s general principles of judicial screening for scientific validity should 
apply to all expert testimony.65 
C.  Gatekeeping and Future Dangerousness 
1.   Barefoot v. Estelle 
At issue in Barefoot was the constitutionality of permitting psychiatrists to 
testify in a capital sentencing hearing about the defendant’s future behavior, 
given that such predictions were shown to be wrong two out of three times.66  At 
the hearing, two psychiatrists testified that the defendant “would probably 
commit further acts of violence and represent a continuing threat to society,”67 
based on a hypothetical question about the crime and the defendant’s conduct.68  
The Court acknowledged the American Psychiatric Association’s opposition to 
future dangerousness testimony because of its extreme unreliability,69 but up-
held its admissibility because disallowing such testimony would be like “disin-
vent[ing] the wheel.”70  Reliability, then as now, was the touchstone for admissi-
bility of evidence at sentencing.71  Nonetheless, the Court noted that the 
Association did not claim that psychiatrists were always wrong with respect to 
future dangerousness predictions—only that they were wrong more often than 
not. 
 
the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particu-
lar field in which it belongs.”  293 F. at 1014. 
 64. See, e.g., Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 705 A.2d 1314, 1323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (review-
ing expert testimony under the Frye standard and addressing scientific validity). 
 65. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 6. 
 66. See 463 U.S. 880, 899–902 (1983).  An amicus brief by the American Psychiatric Association 
before the court explained that no one, including psychiatrists, can predict with any degree of reliability 
that an individual will commit other crimes in the future.  Id. at 899.  Some scholars argue that clinical 
predictions have improved since Barefoot, but even these scholars only contend a slightly better-than-
chance record for clinical predictions.  See Monahan, supra note 5. 
 67. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 884. 
 68. The prosecutor’s hypothetical asked the psychiatrists to assume a number of facts about the 
defendant: his conviction for five nonviolent criminal offenses, arrests for sexual offenses against chil-
dren, a bad reputation in the eight communities the defendant had lived in over ten years, unemploy-
ment during the two months preceding the crime, drug use, boasting of plans to commit crimes to ac-
quaintances, shooting a police officer without provocation from a distance of six inches, and acting as 
though there were nothing unusual after the crime.  Brief for the American Psychiatric Association as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080). 
 69. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 904. 
 70. Id. at 896. 
 71. See Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 464 n.10 (5th Cir. 2000) (Garza, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
cardinal concern of the rules of admissibility for expert testimony—reliability—is also the paramount 
concern in addressing the constitutionality of capital sentencing procedures.”). 
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The Supreme Court concluded the state could sentence the defendant to 
death based on scientifically questionable testimony because the state’s eviden-
tiary rules permitted such testimony.72  The Court distinguished its decision in 
Barefoot from scientific evidence cases in which testimony about future danger-
ousness had been disallowed by explaining that Barefoot sought a constitutional 
rule barring an entire category of expert testimony.73  The Court was “not per-
suaded that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable” and so opined that the 
adversary system would be competent to take account of its shortcomings.74 
Although the Court found “no constitutional barrier to applying the ordi-
nary rules of evidence governing the use of expert testimony,”75 the ordinary 
rules of evidence have changed, and these changes have illuminated the ex-
treme unreliability and irrelevance of expert testimony that has no empirical 
foundation masquerading as science.  Barefoot was wrongly decided, both as a 
matter of evidentiary due process and because it was empirically wrong about 
the ability of the adversary system to sort out the reliable from the unreliable 
expert testimony.76  Barefoot is egregiously wrong-headed by current standards 
for reliability,77 and its effect on capital sentencing proceedings has been perni-
cious and pervasive, undermining fundamental fairness in a way wholly contrary 
to the rule of law.78  Perhaps it is true, as Justices Blackmun and Powell con-
tended, that the death penalty cannot be administered in a way that meets con-
 
 72. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 898 (“[T]he rules of evidence generally extant at the federal and state lev-
els anticipate that relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admitted and its weight left to the fact 
finder, who would have the benefit of cross-examination and contrary evidence by the opposing 
party.”).  Post-Daubert, the Federal Rules of Evidence require judges to act as gatekeepers to ensure 
that only scientifically valid expert testimony be admitted. 
 73. Id. at 899. 
 74. Id. at 901 (holding that because the adversary process could be “trusted to sort out the reliable 
from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness,” the expert testimony should 
not be excluded on that basis). 
 75. Id. at 904. 
 76. See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 6; Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Ef-
fects of Clinical and Scientific Expert Testimony on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 267, 273–77 (2001) (discussing research that suggests jurors are incapable of 
differentiating more scientifically valid expert testimony from less accurate testimony). 
 77. Although the argument has been made that Daubert is not technically inconsistent with Bare-
foot because Daubert involved interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, while Barefoot involved 
interpretation of the Due Process clause of the Constitution, nearly everyone acknowledges the tension 
between the two decisions.  See, e.g., Craig J. Albert, Challenging Deterrence: New Insights on Capital 
Punishment Derived from Panel Data, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 321, 338 (1999) (“[I]t goes too far to say sim-
ply that Daubert impliedly overruled Barefoot, [but] . . . they cannot co-exist as a matter of common 
sense.”).  Moreover, no one persuasively argues that the testimony at issue in Barefoot could meet 
Daubert standards.  See also 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW 
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 298–99 (1997) (acknowledging that the testimony proffered in 
Barefoot could not meet Daubert standards); Paul C. Gianelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999 (1994) (“Daubert required a higher standard for money dam-
ages than Barefoot required for the death penalty.”). 
 78. See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 6. 
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stitutional requirements.79  If so, it appears that sexual offender statutes are 
similarly impervious to rule of law precepts. 
2. Hendricks and Crane 
In Kansas v. Hendricks,80 the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality 
of the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (Kansas Act),81 which provides for 
the indefinite civil commitment of people who are likely to engage in future 
“predatory acts of sexual violence” due to a “mental abnormality or personality 
disorder.”82  Because it requires a finding of likely future violence, the Kansas 
Act appears to provide for an expert’s prediction of future dangerousness. 
The defendant, Leroy Hendricks, had been “convicted of taking ‘indecent 
liberties’ with two thirteen-year[-]old boys.”83  He served a ten-year sentence for 
his crime.  Shortly before he was due to be released to a halfway house, the 
state sought civil commitment under the Kansas Act.84  During his commitment 
trial before a jury, Hendricks testified that he had five prior convictions for 
sexually molesting children and had been treated at and discharged from a state 
psychiatric institution, after which he continued to abuse children, including his 
own stepchildren.85  He testified that when he was under stress he could not 
“control the urge,” and that the only way he could keep from sexually molesting 
children in the future was “to die.”86 
Both the state’s expert and the defendant’s expert testified about future 
dangerousness.  The state’s experts were a clinical social worker and a psy-
chologist, both of whom opined that Hendricks was a pedophile.87  The psy-
chologist testified that, unless confined, Hendricks was likely to commit sexual 
offenses in the future.88  Hendricks’ expert, a psychiatrist, testified that “it was 
not possible to predict with any degree of accuracy the future dangerousness of 
a sex offender.”89  The jury was nonetheless persuaded beyond a reasonable 
doubt by the state’s evidence that Hendricks was likely to commit a future 
 
 79. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145–46 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he inevita-
bility of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some defen-
dants, a system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and reliable sentences of death required by the 
Constitution.”); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of Today’s 
Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 347 (1998) 
(“Justice Powell came to a similar conclusion after his retirement.”).  Notably, two states, Illinois and 
Maryland, have reached similar conclusions, and have placed a moratorium on death penalty prosecu-
tions because of due process concerns.  See Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Verdict Errors, Bars Execu-
tions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at A1. 
 80. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 81. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01–29a21 (1994). 
 82. Id. §§ 59-29a01–29a07. 
 83. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 353. 
 84. Id. at 354. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 355. 
 87. Id. at 355 n.2. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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crime, the judge determined that pedophilia qualifies as a mental abnormality 
under the statute, and Hendricks was committed. 
The issues on appeal included due process, double jeopardy, and ex-post 
facto clause claims.  The Kansas Supreme Court accepted Hendricks’s due 
process claim, holding that substantive due process requires a showing, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that the person to be committed is both mentally ill 
and poses a danger to himself or to others.90  The United States Supreme Court 
disagreed, holding that the Kansas Act’s definition of mental abnormality satis-
fied due process requirements.  Although the Court acknowledged that involun-
tary commitment statutes must adhere to “proper procedures and evidentiary 
standards,” it did not discuss those standards.91  It did not mention Barefoot, 
Daubert, the need for reliability, or any scientific basis for the expert testimony 
on dangerousness.  It cited a 1984 case for the proposition that “there is nothing 
inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct,”92 but it 
did not elaborate.  And although it acknowledged the need for a showing of 
“more than a mere predisposition to violence,” it determined that the Kansas 
Act’s twin requirements of evidence of past sexual offenses and present mental 
abnormality making recidivism likely were sufficient.93  Nowhere did the court 
grapple with the scientific basis for a prediction of future dangerousness. 
In Kansas v. Crane,94 the Supreme Court revisited the Kansas Act to deter-
mine the application of Hendricks to the indefinite civil commitment of a con-
victed flasher.95  Michael Crane had been convicted and had served time for 
lewd and lascivious behavior, after which the state sought civil commitment un-
der the Kansas Act.  Crane argued the state had not proved that he completely 
lacked control over his behavior and that Hendricks required such a showing. 
The Supreme Court held that although the state need not prove a complete 
lack of control under the Kansas Act, the Constitution does require some 
“proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior,”96 and it vacated and re-
manded the case for such a determination.97  Once more, however, the Court 
 
 90. Id. at 356. 
 91. Id. at 357. 
 92. Id. at 358 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984)). 
 93. Id.  The Court acknowledged that dangerousness alone was not enough for indefinite involun-
tary commitment but held that a showing that the offender continues to have inadequate control over 
his behavior due to a present mental abnormality would suffice.  Id. at 358, 364. 
 94. 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
 95. Crane was convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior for exposing himself to a tanning salon 
attendant.  In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 286 (Kan. 2000).  The prior conduct required for commitment under 
the Kansas Act consisted of an aggravated sexual battery conviction that was overturned on appeal.  Id.  
The event giving rise to the sexual battery charges actually occurred thirty minutes after Crane left the 
tanning salon.  Id.  He entered a video store, grabbed a clerk, exposed himself, and threatened to rape 
her before suddenly stopping and running out of the store.  Id.  Crane pled guilty to aggravated sexual 
battery, which met the requirement for prior sexual offense history.  Id. 
 96. Crane, 534 U.S. at 411. 
 97. Id. at 413, 415. 
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avoided any discussion of whether predictions of dangerousness were reliable 
or what such predictions could mean in the context of an exhibitionist. 
 
Future dangerousness testimony based on clinical judgment alone has been 
overwhelmingly castigated by the profession and so fails peer review, publica-
tion, and the general acceptance prongs of Daubert.98  Clinical predictions of fu-
ture dangerousness are not based on scientific study, nor do they even purport 
to be based on the scientific method.  Because such predictions are frequently 
wrong, they cannot meet the error rate inquiry.99  Even actuarial predictions, 
though somewhat more accurate than clinical predictions, still are tenuous.100  
Nonetheless, even though they cannot meet criteria for valid science, expert 
predictions are widely used as a basis for deprivations of life and liberty.101  The 
admission of such testimony appears to be a result of the extraordinary public 
pressure on courts and legislatures to control crime. 
III 
DATA ON VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
Public pressure for strengthened crime control measures is fueled by stories 
of sexual murders—especially those of children—as well as of gang homicides 
and rape, which occupy the national and international media and feed the fears 
of an increasingly violent society.102  Certainly, the U.S. prison population is 
growing at an alarming rate.103  Violence in America is world famous, is per-
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Although the experts in Barefoot made bald assertions that they were invariably accurate, they 
offered no substantiation for their claims.  Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896–97 (1983). 
 100. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 6, at 1845 n.3. 
 101. See Scherr, supra note 3, at 2 (“[W]e should expect the rules of evidence . . . to require the ex-
clusion of predictive expertise . . . no appellate court has ever ordered exclusion.”).  Professor Scherr 
contends that this is because it is expedient for the courts to rely on expert opinions, and that they 
therefore meet the “fit” requirements of Daubert.  Id. at 2–3.  While courts overwhelmingly admit ex-
pert future dangerousness testimony (and probably do so because they find it expedient), they rarely 
articulate any principled basis for doing so.  We disagree with Professor Scherr that unscientific predic-
tions can meet Daubert requirements, either for reliability or fit.  Rather, we argue that the courts 
should not circumvent their gatekeeping duties in this way. 
 102. There is some question about whether this perception that violence is increasing in society is 
accurate.  Some commentators have asserted that violence is actually decreasing over time as society 
industrializes, and remark that violence in tribal societies is still prevalent.  MARTIN DALY & MARGO 
WILSON, HOMICIDE 291 (Sarah Blaffer Hardy & Richard W. Wrangham eds., Aldine De Gruyter 
1988) (1944).  For example, homicide is estimated to have accounted for 35% of the adult male mortal-
ity and 29% of the adult female mortality among tribal peoples in New Guinea and the Amazon.  Id.  
Daly and Wilson further note that “[e]ven the gentle Kung San foragers of the Kalahari desert had a 
homicide rate approximately equivalent to that of the most violent urban American ghettos.”  Id.  
Moreover, most crimes labeled “violent” are really batteries involving no physical injuries; when physi-
cal injuries are present, they usually do not require medical treatment, and even if they do, they do not 
require hospitalization.  BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 18–19, 22–23, 75–76, 95 (2000), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus00.pdf. 
 103. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern 
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 831 (2000) (“The number of people in prison in the United States 
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ceived to be increasing over time, and is considered a threat to civil society.104  
Violent recidivism is likewise perceived to be a horrifying reality, although the 
base rate of violent recidivism is actually quite low. 105  In response, there has 
been an increased emphasis on preventive detention and death, magnifying the 
role of future dangerousness predictions.  Predictions about behavior, however, 
are empirically problematic. 
A. Actuarial Predictions 
Concerned about the inaccuracy of clinical predictions, researchers began to 
study ways to improve the accuracy of future dangerousness predictions.106  
Their goal was to develop an empirically based actuarial instrument that would 
reflect a state-of-the-art understanding of the factors correlated with violence 
and their interrelationships.107  These risk factors would then be combined to 
create a scoring instrument that took into account the interrelationship of vari-
ous risk factors and the population base rates, then assigned weight to the indi-
vidual risk factors.  The instrument would then yield an overall “score” that 
ranked levels of risk.108 
Currently, it is well accepted that actuarial instruments offer the most accu-
rate way of making future dangerousness predictions.109  The predominant in-
 
has increased by almost 500% since 1972 while the population itself has increased by only 28%.”).  In 
1997 the prison population had grown to 1.2 million from 200,000 in 1972.  Id. at 831 n.6.  When proba-
tion and parole are included, 3% of the population was under some form of correctional supervision in 
1998.  Id. at 832–33 (citing the high number of Americans under correctional supervision and espousing 
a Durkheimian view that excessive punishment is the attempt of a fragmenting society to bind itself to-
gether). 
 104. See Franklin E. Zimring, Will Success Spoil James Q. Wilson?, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
828, 830 (1995) (reviewing CRIME (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1995) (“U.S. rates of prop-
erty crime other than robbery are near the rates of other Western nations, while U.S. lethal violence 
rates are four to eight times the rates of other highly developed nations.”). 
 105. See R. Karl Hanson et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: What We Know and What We Need to 
Know, in SEXUALLY COERCIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 5, at 154, 163 (“Overall, the observed rates [of 
sexual recidivism] are between 10% and 15% after 5 years and approximately 20% after 10 years.”).  
The base rate of sexual recidivism rates for rapists was reported at 18.9%, and 12.7% for child moles-
ters.  R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussière, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender 
Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348, 351 (1998). 
 106. CHRISTOPHER WEBSTER ET AL., THE VIOLENCE PREDICTION SCHEME: ASSESSING 
DANGEROUSNESS IN HIGH RISK MEN xi, xii (1994) (describing the genesis and goals of the violence 
risk assessment guide). 
 107. See id.; see also VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND 
MANAGING RISK 190 (1998). 
 108. See Monahan, supra note 5, at 905–10 (evaluating risk assessment instruments).  The concept of 
risk encompasses not only the presence of danger, but its probability of occurrence.  See Eric S. Janus & 
Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissi-
bility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM L. REV. 1443, 1448–49 (2003) (addressing the concept of risk in 
predictions). 
 109. A number of studies of these instruments have shown that actuarial measures are more accu-
rate predictors than clinical judgment.  See, e.g., Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Don’t Con-
fuse Me With the Facts: Common Errors in Violence Risk Assessment at Capital Sentencing, 26 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 20, 28 (1999) (stating that repeated studies of actuarial methods have demonstrated 
them to be superior to clinical judgment standing alone); Mairead Dolan & Michael Doyle, Violence 
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strument used in assessing violence (including sexual violence) is the Violence 
Risk Assessment Guide (VRAG).110  The predominant instruments for sexual 
offender risk assessment are the Sexual Offender Risk Assessment Guide 
(SORAG)111 and the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offense Recidivism 
(RRASOR).112  Of these, the VRAG is “the best currently available method to 
predict future violence.”113  Its close cousin, the SORAG, is not quite as accu-
rate.114 
In each of these instruments, violent behavior (violent sexual behavior in 
the SORAG and RRASOR) is statistically correlated115 with specific factors in 
the person’s past behavior (a pattern of past violence, for example), circum-
stances (such as poverty), attitudes toward others (failure to marry or form 
equivalent relationship), medical and psychiatric history (age when problems 
began and any injuries to the brain), and substance abuse (alcohol or drugs).116  
The sexual violence instruments tend to include phallometric studies.117  They 
also include factors such as whether the victim was a stranger and whether the 
 
Risk Prediction: Clinical and Actuarial Measures and the Role of the Psychopathy Checklist, 177 BRIT. J. 
PSYCHOL. 303, 305–09 (2000) (citing results of studies on clinical risk assessment tools and their predic-
tive validity); Robert A. Prentky, A 15-Year Retrospective on Sexual Coercion: Advances and Projec-
tions, in SEXUALLY COERCIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 5, at 13, 21 (“[T]he predictive efficacy of actuar-
ial methods of risk assessment are superior to clinically derived assessments of risk.”).  One reason for 
this may be that “much of the information commonly assessed in these [clinical] interviews, such as low 
victim empathy, denial, and lack of motivation for treatment, were unrelated to sexual offense recidi-
vism.”  Hanson et al., supra note 105, at 158. 
 110. QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 107, at 141. 
 111. Id. at 155–59 (proposing SORAG as an enhancement to VRAG). 
 112. RRASOR is based on four factors: prior sexual offenses, age at release (young is worse), gen-
der of the victim (male is worse), and relationship to the victim (related is better).  Mee & Hall, supra 
note 7, at 102.  In their discussion, Mee and Hall included the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Test-
Revised (MnSOST-R) as a sex offender instrument.  Id. at 107.  However, Barbaree’s study found that 
it “failed to meet conventional levels of statistical significance in the prediction of serious and sexual 
recidivism” and so it has been omitted here.  See Howard E. Barbaree et al., Evaluating the Predictive 
Accuracy of Six Risk Assessment Instruments for Adult Sex Offenders, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 490, 
512 (2001). 
 113. Mee & Hall, supra note 7, at 102. 
 114. Id. at 102 n.227 (citing interview with the developer of both the VRAG and the SORAG). 
 115. As Stephen Gould explains, “Correlation assesses the tendency of one measure to vary in con-
cert with another.”  GOULD, supra note 1, at 269.  Correlation, with regard to linear relationships, is 
measured by using Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient, which ranges from +1 for perfect 
positive correlation, 0 for no correlation, to -1 for perfect negative correlation.  Id. at 270. 
 116. See Hanson & Bussière, supra note 105, at 353–56 (discussing and comparing risk factors).  
These factors are not “causes” of violence.  They are factors that are associated with violence.  See 
Stephan F. Lanes, Error and Uncertainty in Causal Inference, in CAUSAL INFERENCE 173, 182–85 
(Kenneth J. Rothman ed., 1988) (“The uncertainty in causal inference is attributable to the fact that we 
cannot establish that an association is valid.”).  An unidentifiable error may exist and it may cause the 
observation.  Id.  The most that can be expected of strength of association and the level of statistical 
significance is that they affect subjective beliefs.  See id. at 186. 
 117. “Phallometry is a diagnostic method to assess sexual arousal by measuring blood flow (tumes-
cence) to the penis during the presentation of potentially erotic stimuli in the laboratory.”  CTR. FOR 
SEX OFFENDER MGMT., UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDING BEHAVIOR: EMERGING 
RESEARCH, TREATMENT APPROACHES, AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (1999), 
http://www.csom.org/pubs/juvbrf10.html.  The report also notes that this is a controversial practice and 
explains the pitfalls involved, especially with juvenile offenders.  Id. 
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victim was male.118  These factors are then used in combination to assess a level 
of probability of future risk.  The variables considered for the instruments are 
drawn from empirical studies showing a statistical association with violent (or 
sexually violent) behavior.119 
Even such instruments and their structured reasoning requirements, how-
ever, do not obviate all the problems of human judgment.120  Structured analysis 
offers many advantages in light of the difficulty people have in synthesizing dif-
ferently weighted likelihoods of varying significance such as risk factors for vio-
lent behavior;121 but the actuarial instrument is only as effective as the risk fac-
tors used and the weight given them, making accurate prediction elusive in all 
but the highest of the risk categories.122  For example, the risk factor descriptions 
may be vague, decreasing their reliability,123 and sometimes the factors are not 
independent, as with anger and the inability to sustain relationships.124 
 
 118. See Hanson et al., supra note 105, at 157 (discussing risk factors as predictors of sexual offense 
recidivism). 
 119. “Association” means that there is a statistically significant correlation of a particular factor 
with violent behavior.  Statistical significance is set by convention at a level of significance, or p-value of 
0.05, which corresponds to a confidence level of 95%.  The object of statistical significance tests is to 
keep the scientist from asserting a positive effect when the effect may actually be due to chance.  See 
David Ozonhoff & Leslie I. Boden, Truth & Consequences: Health Agency Responses to Environmental 
Health Problems, 12 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 70, 73–74 (1987) (stating that statistical significance 
testing tries to avoid accepting results as significant when they may have been arrived at only by 
chance).  If the p-value is 0.01, the evidence is said to be highly statistically significant.  Stephen E. 
Fienberg et al., Understanding and Evaluating Statistical Evidence in Litigation, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 22 
(1995).  Fienberg further clarifies, “By rejecting a hypothesis only when the test is statistically signifi-
cant, we have placed an upper bound, 5% on the chance of rejecting a true hypothesis.”  Id.  Another 
way of explaining this is that it describes the probability that the procedure produced the observed ef-
fect by chance.  See id.  If the test is not statistically significant, it may either be because the results were 
due to chance or because the test lacked the power to discern a difference between the null hypothesis 
and the proposed effect.  See id.  Power increases with the size of the study and with the degree of dif-
ference from the null hypothesis (the more extreme the alternatives, the better the power).  See id. 
 120. It is important to bear in mind that risk is a social construct.  Although it uses probabilistic 
analysis and quantification, it is not an exact science.  See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, RISK: ANALYSIS, 
PERCEPTION AND MANAGEMENT 7 (1992) (explaining that some subjectivity is always a part of risk 
assessment).  Indeed, all science is value-laden, and risk assessment is not different in that regard.  See 
generally Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for Triers of Sci-
ence, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1563 (2000) (acknowledging the subjectivity inherent in all scientific method-
ologies and proposing a five-step framework to follow for sound analysis of scientific evidence). 
 121. J. RICHARD EISER & JOOP VAN DER PLIGT, ATTITUDES AND DECISIONS 100 (1988) 
(“[A]ccuracy declines considerably when the number of features or the number of alternatives in-
creases [and the] . . . reliability with which choice rules are used tends to decrease as the decision-
maker’s information load increases.”). 
 122. See Morse, supra note 31, at 59 (“It is a truism of behavioral science that statistical, ‘cookbook’ 
prediction based on empirically validated risk factors is more accurate than clinical prediction, but de-
spite advances in the database that have improved the cookbook, highly accurate prediction by any 
method eludes us in all but the most obvious cases.”). 
 123. See David Carson, A Risk-Management Approach to Legal Decision-Making About ‘Danger-
ous’ People, in LAW AND UNCERTAINTY: RISKS AND LEGAL PROCESSES 255, 258 (Robert Baldwin 
ed., 1997) (noting the problem of reliability).  For example, even trained clinicians may differ on what 
exactly is meant by “glibness” (a factor on the PCL-R) or “lack of insight” (a factor on the VRAG and 
HCR-20). 
 124. Id. 
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Moreover, all future dangerousness predictions rely heavily on prior crimi-
nal record as an important factor, which is both under- and over-inclusive.  It is 
under-inclusive because it misses violence between intimates, which accounts 
for the highest percentage of violent acts.  Many people with violently aggres-
sive behaviors and a high likelihood of repeating violent behavior, such as 
chronic spouse abusers and stalkers, do not have criminal records.  Using one’s 
criminal record as an important factor is also over-inclusive, because it does not 
allow for the decrease in aggression that occurs with aging or other dynamic fac-
tors.125 
Although testimony based on actuarial instruments is more accurate than 
clinical predictions126 and thus preferable to clinical testimony, these predictions 
are still tenuous bases for making important decisions such as sentencing a de-
fendant to death or to indefinite confinement.  At best, these actuarial instru-
ments correlate only moderately with violence and violent sexual recidivism.127  
Thus, if the instruments are to meet standards for scientific validity, the expert 
must carefully explain the limits of such testimony.128  In order to be helpful, the 
 
 125. For example, three-strikes rules premised on the notion that repeated bad behavior escalates in 
violence overlook the natural decrease in aggression after adolescence.  See Farrington, supra note 32, 
at 425 (“[T]he highest prevalence of homicide is between the ages seventeen and twenty-two.”).  Thus, 
while offending rates drop after the twenties, three-strikes rules are often triggered “just when the 
natural forces of aging would rein in the offenders.”  Robinson, supra note 33, at 1451.  Moreover, with 
treatment, most adolescent brains can be retrained.  The abnormal stress responses in violent offenders 
can be normalized with medication, such as the “selective and thoughtful use of medications that nor-
malize stress responses, delay impulsive reactions, block the craving for drugs, or suppress nonlethal 
paraphilias.”  NIEHOFF, supra note 10, at 265.  Further, the time period that the risk assessment is to 
cover, the circumstances under which it will be implemented (confinement or release), and the individ-
ual’s motivation to refrain from violence (including motivation to comply with treatment), are all dy-
namic factors that should be taken into consideration in assessing risk, but are not.  See, e.g., Janus & 
Prentky, supra note 108, at 1479 (acknowledging that the absence of dynamic factors “may seriously 
undermine the assessment power of [actuarial risk assessment] tools” but contending nonetheless that 
they are superior to clinical judgment). 
 126. There is some evidence that a multidisciplinary team may be able to rival the accuracy of actu-
arial instruments.  See Julian Fuller & Justin Cowan, Risk Assessment in a Multidisciplinary Forensic 
Setting: Clinical Judgement Revisited, 10 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 276, 286 (1999) (acknowledging that 
a multidisciplinary team may provide increased accuracy, approaching that of actuarial instruments).  
However, such teams are unlikely to be employed in capital sentencing or sexual predator determina-
tions.  See, e.g., Beecher-Monas, supra note 13, at 362 (describing clinical future dangerousness testi-
mony at capital sentencing hearings). 
 127. See Barbaree et al., supra note 112, at 492–93 (noting VRAG correlations of 0.44 with violent 
recidivism and RRASOR correlations of 0.27 with sexual recidivism); Janus & Prentky, supra note 108, 
at 1471 (noting the efficacy of VRAG, SORAG, and RRASOR and explaining that the “correlation 
between the SORAG and violent recidivism was 0.38”).  As Janus and Prentky observed, “all . . . [actu-
arial] instruments have shortcomings, and these shortcomings detract from the reliability of the instru-
ments.”  Id.  Another measure of accuracy is a statistical analysis known as the Relative Operating 
Characteristic (ROC).  Mark Binderman, Understanding VRAG: The Violence Risk Assessment Guide, 
10(1–2) FORENSIC EXAMINER 28, 29 (2001).  A test that is no better than chance would have an ROC 
of 0.50; the VRAG’s ROC was 0.76, which means that “if an offender were drawn randomly from each 
of the recidivist and nonrecidivist groups, there was a probability of 0.76 that the recidivist had the 
higher score on the VRAG.”  QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 107, at 148.  This is a statistically significant 
result, comparable to ROC scores for predictions in meteorology and medical imaging.  Binderman, 
supra, at 29. 
 128. Cf. John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, Violent Storms and Violent People: How Meteorology 
Can Inform Risk Communication in Mental Health Law, 51 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, 931, 935–36 (1996) 
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expert needs to educate the jury in a scientifically sound manner, which includes 
explicitly stating the statistical basis for the opinion.129  Violence risk assessment 
is not a yes or no dichotomy; instead, actuarial assessments are probabilistic risk 
estimates that should be acknowledged as uncertain.130  At most, these instru-
ments offer a partial answer, and courts should demand more.131 
B. The Biology of Violence and Sexual Violence 
What is missing from any of the actuarial instruments is causal theory, rec-
ognition of the biology of violence, and explicit discussion of the interrelated-
ness of genes, organisms, and their environment.  Thus, the instruments do little 
to advance our understanding about violent behavior and give us no insight into 
prevention other than removal from society.  However, there has been an ex-
plosion of knowledge about how biological factors, including genetic factors, 
combined with environmental factors such as stress and substance abuse132 can 
increase the chances that a particular individual will become violent.  Indeed, 
many of the risk factors measured by actuarial assessments may be tied to an 
underlying biological function.  But no testable theoretical basis is advanced for 
why the risk factors correlate with violence.  Thus, a major problem with each 
of the risk instruments is its failure to correlate the risk factors with the biology 
of violence and to articulate a hypothesis for the mechanisms of violence.133  Un-
 
(explaining that predictions of the risk of future violence should be modeled explicitly on weather pre-
dictions, with all their qualifiers and uncertainties). 
 129. See Cunningham & Reidy supra note 109, at 34–35 (advocating that experts limit their testi-
mony to predominantly statistical analyses, in order to avoid going beyond the limits of their scientific 
expertise). 
 130. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 6, at 1868.  It is important that juries be informed 
that even the most accurate of the actuarial instruments made predictions of dangerousness for people 
that did not, in fact, later commit acts of violence.  Id. at 1898–99.  For example, of people who were 
placed in the “high risk” category under the VRAG, only 55% actually committed violent acts upon 
release.  Id. at 1878.  That means 45% did not.  Had the “high risk” prediction been the basis for a 
death sentence, nearly half the people sentenced to death would not, in fact, go on to commit any more 
acts of violence. 
 131. Cf. David L. Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations on the 
Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661, 667, 678 (2000) 
(“A lot of previously admitted evidence, especially evidence offered by prosecutors, appears excludable 
for want of a research base. . . .  Psychologists should hesitate before seeking to bring their findings to 
policymakers, fearful that when tested the research might be thought not-yet-done.”). 
 132. Alcohol consumption, which can effectively shut down the activity of small brain cells respon-
sible for cortical function, figures into two out of every three violent crimes.  Judith Roizen, Issues of 
Epidemiology of Alcohol and Violence, in ALCOHOL AND INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE: FOSTERING 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 20 (Susan E. Martin ed. 1993).  We use the cerebral cortex to as-
sess and plan responses, rather than “knee-jerking.”  If the cortex loses some of its inhibitory power, 
such as by deactivation of cortical circuits under the influence of alcohol, some of that regulation is lost 
and “primordial,” instinctive behaviors are released.  The frontal lobes of the brain, of which the cere-
bral cortex is a part, are our most highly evolved brain structures.  They are in charge of critical judg-
ment and learning.  Frank N. Dempster, The Rise and Fall of the Inhibitory Mechanism: Toward a Uni-
fied Theory of Cognitive Development and Aging, 12 DEV. REV. 45, 48–51 (1992). 
 133. See Harris et al., supra note 12, at 197 (attempting to correlate the Psychotherapy Checklist-
Revised (PCL-R) with neuroscience and conceding that much research still needs to be done). 
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til there is an understanding of how violence occurs, there will be little ability to 
control or predict it. 
1. The Evolutionary Perspective 
Current research on the biology of violence suggests that violence is “nor-
mal” aggression gone awry.134  In this view, aggression is thought to be part of 
the normal repertoire of behaviors that has arisen to balance the individual’s 
need to look out for himself and still to maintain good standing within the 
group.135  That violent behavior is part of our normal repertoire of responses to 
certain situations does not mean that it is desirable.136  It does mean that in order 
to understand and control violence, we need to probe the situations that elicit 
violent responses and the complex biological mediators of these responses.137 
From the perspective of evolutionary biology, the situations eliciting aggres-
sion and violence commonly involve competition for reproductive resources.138  
In humans, demographically speaking, most violence is perpetrated by young 
males against other unrelated young males under circumstances in which risk-
taking improves their chances of reproductive success.139  Even spousal murders 
and infanticide can be viewed as aggressive responses to threats to reproductive 
success.140  Most spousal homicides result from male attempts to exert control 
 
 134. Richard J. Davidson et al., Dysfunction in the Neural Circuitry of Emotion Regulation: A Possi-
ble Prelude to Violence, 289 SCIENCE 591, 591 (2000). 
 135. NIEHOFF, supra note 10, at 76. 
 136. DALY & WILSON, supra note 102, at 57 (noting that although violence may be abhorrent, it 
cannot be pathological, because pathology connotes a breakdown in biological systems and “people 
and other animals possess complex psychophysiological machinery that is clearly designed for the pro-
duction and regulation of violence”). 
 137. See id. at 60–61 (giving the example of bird mate-guarding paternity assurance as a testable hy-
pothesis arising from “explanations of why particular proximal objectives and motivators have evolved 
to play their particular roles in the causal control of behavior, and why they are calibrated as they 
are.”).  The mate-guarding behavior of birds, for example, varies in relation to observable clues about 
female fertility, as well as the proximity, abundance, and attractiveness of male rivals.  Id. 
 138. See id. at 294–95 (noting young men with dismal prospects are the most likely to be victims and 
perpetrators of homicide, competing for control over the reproductive capacities of women); JARED 
DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 319–28 (2005) (arguing that 
societal collapse, including the Rwandan genocide, is frequently the result of a confluence of factors 
resulting in Malthusian population pressures exploding into violence when large numbers of young men 
cannot command the assets to attract women and begin their own families).  For example, in mice bred 
for aggression the aggression trait did not begin to manifest until the animals reached sexual maturity, 
and then began to wane with age and repeated interactions with less aggressive mice.  See Robert B. 
Cairns, Aggression from a Developmental Perspective: Genes, Environments and Interactions, in 
GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 45, 47–48 (Gregory R. Bock & Jamie A. 
Goode eds., 1996) (hypothesizing aggressive behavior, including violent behavior, may be flexible re-
sponses to social conditions that reflect dynamic interactions realigning the nervous system with the 
outside social world). 
 139. See DALY & WILSON, supra note 102, at 294 (noting that the predominant form of homicide is 
between “unrelated men, especially young men whose dismal prospects make dangerous escalation of 
social competition attractive”). 
 140. For example, in gorillas, a victorious challenging male will kill all the suckling offspring in the 
vanquished male’s harem, thus causing the female to stop lactating and go into estrus.  See MATT 
RIDLEY, THE AGILE GENE: HOW NATURE TURNS ON NURTURE 19–20 (2004) (“Infanticide is com-
mon among gorillas, as it is among many primates.”). 
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over women’s reproductive capacities and women’s efforts at independence 
from coercion.141  Whether rape is a reproductive strategy is more contentious, 
with some scholars claiming it to be a “natural,” genetically based reproductive 
strategy,142 and others claiming that rape is not a reproductive, but an aggressive 
and dominance strategy—a weapon, not an appetite.143  No one has yet ad-
vanced an evolutionary strategy as the basis for pedophilia. 
2. Behavioral Traits 
Of course, individuals vary in their responses to given situations, and this 
must be due at least in part to genetic variations among individuals.144  Differ-
ences in personality account for a large percentage of behavioral differences.145  
But while behavioral diversity within populations undoubtedly has some genetic 
aspects, behavioral differences may also be due in part to differences in the en-
vironment in which each individual matured and resides.  All behavior is a 
complex intermingling of nature and nurture.146 
a. Stress responses.  Stress responses also demonstrate this complex in-
teraction.  Although most violence is perpetrated by young men against other 
young men, violent tendencies can develop prenatally147 or in early infancy148 or 
 
 141. See Margo Wilson et al., Lethal and Nonlethal Violence Against Wives, 17 CAN. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 331, 343–44 (1995) (observing escalation of violence toward wives as a correlate of 
other controlling behaviors); DALY & WILSON, supra note 102, at 295 (“[M]ale sexual proprietariness is 
the principal source of conflict in the great majority of spousal homicides.”). 
 142. RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL 
BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION 59 (2000) (claiming that rape may be an adaptation favored by natural 
selection because it increases male reproductive success by increasing a male’s mating partners).  But 
see Elizabeth A. Lloyd, Violence Against Science, in EVOLUTION, GENDER AND RAPE 235, 235–57 
(Cheryl B. Travis ed., 2003) (discrediting Thornhill and Palmer’s “reduced view of rape as sex” and 
identifying weaknesses in their evolutionary theory of why men rape). 
 143. See NIEHOFF, supra note 10, at 164 (claiming rape is motivated by aggression and noting testos-
terone blocking drugs chill sexual behavior but not anti-social aggression); Grant T. Harris et al., Ap-
praisal and Management of Risk in Sexual Aggressors: Implications for Criminal Justice Policy, 4 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 73, 85 (1998) (“[A]lthough rapists are more dangerous [than child moles-
ters] (i.e., more likely to exhibit violent recidivism) overall, much of that violence does not appear to be 
sexually motivated.”). 
 144. See V. Elving Anderson, Genes, Behavior, and Responsibility: Research Perspectives, in THE 
GENETIC FRONTIER: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 105, 105–06 (Mark S. Frankel & Albert H. Teich eds., 
1994) (explaining that although few behaviors are completely without genetic and environmental influ-
ences, “genes do not determine one’s destiny in a predictable manner” and the effects are not unidirec-
tional: genes can influence behavior, but behavior can also affect genetic expression). 
 145. Cf. Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 14, at 18 (noting the challenge individual variation poses to 
theories of evolutionary psychology). 
 146. See NIEHOFF, supra note 10, at 51–53 (discussing the complex inter-relationship of biology and 
the environment). 
 147. See, e.g., Constance Holden, The Violence of the Lambs, 289 SCIENCE 580, 580 (2000) (“Re-
searchers are increasingly coming to view violence as the end result of multiple risk factors that may 
include a biological vulnerability—either genetic or created in the prenatal environment—that can be 
brought out or reinforced in the social environment.”). 
 148. Frans B. M. De Waal, Primates: A Natural Heritage of Conflict Resolution, 289 SCIENCE 586, 
588 (2000) (discussing the violence between two infant monkeys after displaying aggression and biting 
each other). 
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can emerge after the onset of puberty.149  Environmental factors often play a 
role.150  Disruption of animals’ early environment can cause increased nervous 
system sensitivity to stress.151  Variations in maternal care also influence the de-
velopment of hormonal stress response.152  All mammals, including humans, so-
cialize their young.  It may be that “neuropsychological impairments disrupt 
normal development and increase vulnerability” to poor social environments.153 
Curiously, although crowding has often been considered a factor in aggres-
sive behavior, this does not appear to be the case in primates.154  Even in ro-
dents, social isolation can produce aggression that intensifies as the isolation 
time increases, particularly when such isolation takes place at puberty.155  
Physiological responses to environmental stimuli can also predispose individu-
als to engage in violent behavior.  For example, although some violent criminals 
have lowered central nervous system (CNS)156 and autonomic nervous system 
(ANS) arousal,157 others have heightened arousal.158  Depression, violent aggres-
 
 149. See, e.g., NIEHOFF, supra note 10, at 159. 
 150. See, e.g., Darlene Francis et al., Nongenomic Transmission Across Generations of Maternal Be-
havior and Stress Responses in the Rat, 286 SCIENCE 1155, 1158 (1999) (“[I]ndividual differences in the 
expression of genes in brain regions that regulate stress reactivity can be transmitted from one genera-
tion to the next through behavior . . . [through] differences in maternal care during the first week of 
life.”). 
 151. NIEHOFF, supra note 10, at 274. 
 152. Francis et al., supra note 150, at 1155. 
 153. James C. Howell & J. David Hawkins, Prevention of Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 263, 
268 (1998) (citing Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behav-
ior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674 (1993)); cf. Morse, supra note 31, at 56 
(“[A]ll societies that survive surely place limits on risk and will act to prevent danger from those for 
whom socialization has apparently failed.”). 
 154. See FRANS B. M. DE WAAL, TREE OF ORIGIN: WHAT PRIMATE BEHAVIOR CAN TELL US 
ABOUT HUMAN SOCIAL EVOLUTION 41, 48 (2001) (“[T]he connection between crowding and aggres-
sion, initially demonstrated in rodents, fails to hold in monkeys and apes.”). 
 155. D. Brunner & R. Hen, Insights into the Neurobiology of Impulsive Behavior from Serotonin 
Receptor Knockout Mice, 836 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 81 (1997); see also NIEHOFF, supra note 10, at 
269 (discussing studies finding that aggression in isolated rats becomes expressed most strongly after 
puberty). 
 156. The normal human CNS displays immediate, short-term, instinctive reflexive activity as a first 
line of defense to real or perceived threats. 
 157. Measures of antisocial behavior in fifteen-year-old males have been correlated with reduced 
autonomic nervous system activation.  See Adrian Raine et al., Autonomic Nervous System Factors Un-
derlying Disinhibited, Antisocial, and Violent Behavior: Biosocial Perspectives and Treatment Implica-
tions, 794 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 46, 48 (1996) (reviewing nine-year prospective study of crime de-
velopment and noting it is the “first study providing evidence for underarousal in an antisocial 
population in all three psychophysiological response systems”).  Further studies showed that measures 
of underarousal of the CNS and ANS taken at fifteen years of age were related to criminality status as-
sessed at twenty-four years of age.  Adrian Raine et al., Relationships Between Central and Autonomic 
Measures of Arousal at Age 15 Years and Criminality at Age 24 Years, 47 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 
1003, 1003 (1990). 
 158. NIEHOFF, supra note 10, at 181.  Lowered levels of arousal were accompanied by decreased 
activation of the reticular activating system (RAS), which is the part of the brain that controls 
sleep/wake cycles and arousal, and lowered hypothalamic-modulated stress responses.  See id.  Gener-
ally speaking, the hypothalamus, along with the RAS, helps regulate the body’s physiological response 
to stress, often referred to as “fight or flight.”  ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, STRESS, THE AGING BRAIN, 
AND THE MECHANISMS OF NEURON DEATH 3–9 (1999).  For a more detailed discussion of the stress 
response, see Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Science and Admissi-
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sion, and antisocial personality disorder have all been linked to problems with 
the stress response.159  Although each of these disorders has a different pattern 
of expression, all are associated with abnormal endocrine feedback, norepi-
nephrine and serotonin functions, and altered glucocorticoid levels.160  Studies of 
recidivistic violent offenders, adults with antisocial personality disorder, and an-
tisocial adolescents have all documented statistically significant reductions in 
levels of cortisol, the main circulating stress hormone.161  This suggests that in-
appropriately violent behavior may sometimes involve a stress response disor-
der, one in which the response to a threat is too weak rather than too strong.  
People who appear to lack a conscience may actually lack the biological ma-
chinery necessary to warn them that they are heading for disaster.162 
Early environmental cues may calibrate behavior irrevocably.163  Moreover, 
these early cues may indicate the kind of social environment the child has been 
born into.  For example, a person who has been treated violently in childhood 
has likely “been born into a social environment where violence is an important 
avenue of social instrumentality.”164  Thus, exposing a child to violence may 
permanently lower the threshold for activation of the “fight or flight” response 
and may account for the disproportionate aggression in adults who were abused 
as children.165  Undoubtedly, some of these effects may have a genetic compo-
nent.  But genes do not determine behavior.  They may increase the probability 
a behavior will occur, but they do not cause it directly.166 
b. Sex hormones.  Hormones, which are regulated by the hypothalamus 
and the ANS, can play a role as well.  Testosterone affects levels of aggression 
even in the womb, at least in mice, whose intrauterine positioning between sib-
 
bility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 12–14 (2001).  In order to 
initiate “fight or flight” responses, there must be an initial arm, an arousal response, and the part to the 
brain that fulfills that function is the RAS.  The RAS projects into many regions, simultaneously alert-
ing the cortex to the event and priming the motor system to be able to fight or flee.  It also projects to 
the hypothalamus, where the arousal response triggers the stress response. 
 159. NIEHOFF, supra note 10, at 183. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 181.  For additional information on the studies cited by Niehoff, see also Bo Bergman & 
Bo Brismar, Hormone Levels and Personality Traits in Abusive and Suicidal Male Alcoholics, 18 
ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL RES. 311, 311–15 (1994); Keith McBurnett et al., Anxiety, 
Inhibition, and Conduct Disorder in Children: II. Relation to Salivary Cortisol, 30 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD 
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 192 (1991); Matti Virkkunen et al., CSF Biochemistries, Glucose Me-
tabolism, and Diurnal Activity Rhythms in Alcoholic, Violent Offenders, Fire Setters, and Healthy Vol-
unteers, 51 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 20 (1994); Matti Virkkunen, Urinary Free Cortisol Secretion 
in Habitually Violent Offenders, 72 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDANAVICA 40, 40 (1985). 
 162. See NIEHOFF, supra note 10, at 181 (“[N]o warning bell of anxiety or disgust sounds when . . . 
[antisocial individuals are] about to commit an atrocity.”). 
 163. Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 14, at 54. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Robert Plomin & Michael Rutter, Child Development, Molecular Genetics, and What to Do 
with Genes Once They Are Found, 69 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 1223, 1224 (1998). 
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ling males and females affects levels in post-birth aggression.167  Testosterone in 
boys surges at age ten, rising to a plateau by age fourteen, when aggressive be-
havior starts accelerating.168  Males start to kill each other at an appreciable rate 
only after they reach adolescence.169  This is also the age at which hormone lev-
els are fluctuating widely.  However, delinquent behavior, adjustment problems, 
and rebelliousness are actually more likely to be associated with lower testos-
terone levels.170  Apparently, testosterone functions as a sensitizer, permitting 
males to match the social environment with an appropriate response.171 
3. Impaired Brains 
Structural dysfunction may also contribute to violent behavior.  Damage, 
the decreased metabolizing and uptake of glucose, reduced blood flow to the 
frontal lobes, and reduced function have all been observed in the frontal cortex 
of violent individuals and murderers.172  Studies using positron emission tomo-
graphy (PET) and single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), 
which are imaging devices designed to measure brain function by showing 
changes in the metabolism of glucose, have demonstrated that murderers have 
decreased glucose utilization in the frontal lobes compared to age- and gender-
matched subjects.173 
How do we perceive the world around us?  We process information first 
through evolutionarily conserved, instinctive systems.174  That is, we inherited a 
spinal cord and brainstem very similar to those in lower species.  These parts of 
the brain have virtually identical functions in lower species and include basic 
processes like sleep-wake cycle control, respiration, and locomotion, along with 
 
 167. Frederick S. vom Saal, Models of Early Hormonal Effects on Intrasex Aggression in Mice, in 
HORMONES AND AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 197, 198 (Bruce B. Svare ed., 1983). 
 168. NIEHOFF, supra note 10, at 159. 
 169. See DALY & WILSON, supra note 102, at 22 (“[Fourteen] is about the age at which people begin 
to kill one another at an appreciable rate.”). 
 170. NIEHOFF, supra note 10, at 160. 
 171. Renee J. Primus & Carol K. Kellogg, Gonadal Hormones During Puberty Organize Environ-
ment-Related Social Interaction in the Male Rat, 24 HORMONES & BEHAV. 311, 320 (1990) (“The pres-
ence of testosterone [in rats] . . . appears to be critical for the expression of environment-related 
changes [in social interaction].”). 
 172. Adrian Raine et al., Brain Abnormalities in Murderers Indicated by Positron Emission Tomo-
graphy, 42 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 495, 495–504 (1997); Adrian Raine et al., Selective Reductions in 
Prefrontal Glucose Metabolism in Murderers, 36 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 365, 365–73 (1994).  The 
subjects in these studies did not differ in handedness, schizophrenia, ethnicity, etc.  Id. at 365. 
 173. Adrian Raine et al., Reduced Prefrontal and Increased Subcortical Brain Functioning Assessed 
Using Positron Emission Tomography in Predatory and Affective Murderers, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 319, 
319–30 (1998).  This study was extended to a population of impulsive murderers compared to a group 
of predatory violent offenders, and the results suggest that impulsive murderers have decreased glucose 
metabolism in the frontal lobes while predatory murderers do not.  Id. at 319; see also Nora D. Volkow 
& Laurence Tancredi, Neural Substrates of Violent Behaviour: A Preliminary Study with Positron Emis-
sion Tomography, 151 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 668, 668–72 (1987) (showing a pattern of decreased activity in 
the frontal cortex of a group of murderers as compared to controls and hypothesizing that temporocor-
tical dysfunction may implicate emotional reasoning). 
 174. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 
111 (1994). 
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primordial drives such as those related to feeding, drinking, procreation, and 
emotions.  These systems were conserved in evolution because of their survival 
value, their success in “fight or flight” responses. 
On the other hand, more advanced species evolved a series of newer brain 
structures, in particular, the cerebral cortex.175  Humans have much greater 
amounts of cerebral cortex than other primates and apes, which allows us to 
reach vastly greater heights, in evolutionary terms.  On an everyday basis, these 
newly evolved parts of the brain receive their information from the older, pri-
mordial, emotional systems.  However, they do this in the context of a complex 
environment and, importantly, within the process of enculturation. 
In general, the role of the cortex is to control, through inhibition, those old 
parts of the brain.176  If the cortex loses some of its inhibitory power, therefore, 
“primordial” behaviors are released.  This can occur when, for example, the 
cortex suffers from decreased blood flow, or metabolism, known as “hypofron-
tality.”  Instinctive behaviors can then be released, including exaggerated “fight 
or flight” responses to misperceived threats—that is, violent or exaggerated be-
havior in an attempt to attack or flee.  Hypofrontality is evident in such disor-
ders as schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress disorder, and depression.177  Dam-
age, decreased uptake of glucose, reduced blood flow, and reduced function 
have all been observed in the frontal cortex of violent individuals and murder-
ers.178 
 
 175. Dempster, supra note 132. 
 176. Joaquín M. Fuster, Frontal Lobe and Cognitive Development, 31 J. NEUROCYTOLOGY 373, 
373–85 (2002). 
 177. See, e.g., Edgar Garcia-Rill, Disorders of the Reticular Activating System, 49 MED. 
HYPOTHESES 379, 379–82 (1997) (reviewing study that showed hypofrontality in schizophrenic pa-
tients).  Hypofrontality may also lead to the release of “fixed action patterns” which are more complex 
than instincts. Fixed action patterns are automatic brain modules that make complex movements.  
RODOLFO R. LLINÁS, I OF THE VOTEX: FROM NEURONS TO SELF 133 (2001).  These patterns can re-
sult in repetition of sequences of movements, for example, stabbing repeatedly, and may be part of un-
controlled action patterns rather than rage.  Hypofrontality has been shown to occur during dreaming, 
Pierre Maquet et al., Functional Neuroanatomy of Human Rapid-Eye-Movement Sleep and Dreaming, 
383 NATURE 163, 163 (1996).  This may explain why we accept our dreams so readily, why we do not 
question that we are flying or embroiled in an unrealistic situation.  Overreactions to innocuous stimuli 
are likely in these disorders, particularly the anxiety disorders.  Events or conditions could easily lead 
to exaggerated responses such as panic attacks or incapacitation like fear of leaving the house.  Corner-
ing such individuals or placing them under undue stress could elicit exaggerated reactions, such as strik-
ing out due to overperceived threats. 
 178. Raine et al., Brain Abnormalities, supra note 172.  See also Hugo D. Critchley et al., Prefrontal 
and Medial Temporal Correlates of Repetitive Violence to Self and Others, 47 BIOLOGICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 928, 931 (2000); J. Graffman et al., Frontal Lobe Injuries, Violence, and Aggression: A 
Report of the Vietnam Head Injury Study, 46 AM. ACAD. NEUROLOGY 1231, 1231 (1996). 
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Additional studies have found abnormal temporal lobe metabolism179 and le-
sions of the frontal lobes associated with an increased risk of aggressive and vio-
lent behavior.180  Reduced volumes of frontal and temporal cortex have been ob-
served in violent and antisocial personality disorder patients.181  Interestingly, 
adolescents on average show a mild form of this condition.  The brain, espe-
cially the frontal lobes, is still maturing during adolescence, so that the full-
blown inhibition exercised by this region in adulthood is not yet in play.182  Mag-
netic resonance imaging (MRI) testing in adolescents shows mild decreases in 
frontal lobe function compared to that in adults, which, coupled with increased 
levels of sex hormones, can lead to hyper-responsiveness to stimuli.183  These re-
sults suggest that reduction of function in the frontal lobes may be responsible 
for impaired critical judgment and poor impulse control.184 
On the other hand, lack of empathy, rather than impaired impulse control, 
may result from damage to the amygdala.185  Studies on amygdalar function sug-
gest that damage to this part of the brain might lead to disengagement and lack 
of empathy.186  While electrically stimulating the amygdala can elicit the physio-
logical and behavioral signs of emotional states,187 lesions to the amygdala in-
duce an unusually placid and emotionally unengaged individual, a condition 
 
 179. See David Seidenwurm et al., Abnormal Temporal Lobe Metabolism in Violent Subjects: Corre-
lation of Imaging and Neuropsychiatric Findings, 18 AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY 625, 625 (1997) (dis-
cussing study finding abnormalities in the glucose metabolism in the temporal lobe correlated with vio-
lent behavior in humans); Henrik Soderstrom et al., Reduced Regional Cerebral Blood Flow in Non-
Psychotic Violent Offenders, 98 PSYCHIATRY RES. NEUROIMAGING 29, 40 (2000).  The temporal lobe 
contains limbic structures like the hippocampus and amygdala, which are associated with emotional 
states. 
 180. Graffman et al., supra note 178. 
 181. Critchley et al., supra note 178; Adrian Raine et al., Reduced Prefrontal Gray Matter Volume 
and Reduced Autonomic Activity in Antisocial Personality Disorder, 57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 
119, 119 (2000). 
 182. Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal 
MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCI. 861, 861–62 (1999); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for 
Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCI. 859, 859–61 
(1999). 
 183. Younger individuals (eight to twenty years of age) show less efficient activation of the frontal 
lobes than older adults.  Leanne Tamm et al., Maturation of Brain Function Associated With Response 
Inhibition, 41 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1231, 1231–38 (2002).  Normal ado-
lescents also appear to have a sensory gating deficit, whereby they over-respond to repetitive or incon-
sequential stimuli.  Lisa Rasco et al., Effect of Age on Sensory Gating of the Sleep State-Dependent 
P1/P50 Midlatency Auditory Evoked Potential, 3 SLEEP RES. ONLINE 97, 97–105 (2000), available at 
http://www.sro.org/bin/article.dll?Paper&1930&0&0.  This can lead to increased distractibility, which 
can also create unnecessary responsiveness to inconsequential stimuli.  Id.  Given a stressful environ-
ment or other condition that increases arousal, such as hormones, the chances of exaggerated respon-
siveness—too much “fight” or too much “flight”—are increased. 
 184. R. J. R. Blair, Neurocognitive Models of Aggression, The Antisocial Personality Disorder, and 
Psychopathy, 71 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 727, 728 (2001). 
 185. The amygdala is an almond shaped structure deep inside the front end of the temporal lobe and 
part of the limbic system, the “emotional” part of the brain.  NIEHOFF, supra note 10, at 94. 
 186. Id. at 96–97 (stating that the removal of the amygdala can turn an animal into an emotionally 
unavailable being). 
 187. Id. at 92. 
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known as the Kluver-Bucy syndrome.188  Those affected are unable to recognize 
or respond emotionally to a situation that elicits emotional responses in others, 
although they are capable of emitting the right gestures for those emotions.  
Such lack of empathy may be at the root of multiple, premeditated, and serial, 
as opposed to impulsive, killing.189 
4. Sexual Violence 
Far less is known about sexual paraphilias190—offenses other than rape that 
sexually violent predator statutes address, which typically involve child molesta-
tion.  Surprisingly little biological research has been done on sex offenders.191  
Demographically, nearly half the sex offenses against children are perpetrated 
by other children, usually the victim’s family members,192 and ninety percent of 
the rapes of children younger than twelve are committed by someone the victim 
knows.193  However, most sexual predator statutes apply only when the victim 
was a stranger.  The primary impetus for passing these statutes was the sexual 
murder of children by strangers, yet statistics show that these crimes represent 
fewer than one percent of all murders.194 
In contrast to other murders, most child victims of sexual murders are fe-
male, although a greater risk of recidivism occurs when the victim is male.195  
 
 188. DAMASIO, supra note 174, at 134–39. 
 189. See Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 6, at 1866. 
 190. See Martin P. Kafka, The Monoamine Hypothesis for Pathophysiology of Paraphilic Disorders: 
An Update, in SEXUALLY COERCIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 5, at 86–87 (“[P]araphilias found pre-
dominantly in males, are repetitive, compelling, socially deviant behaviors that are associated with per-
sonal distress, harm to others, or other expressions of significant psychosocial impairment.”).  This 
definition excludes adult rapists.  Id. at 87. 
 191. See, e.g., Grant T. Harris & Marnie E. Rice, Actuarial Assessment of Risk Among Sex Offend-
ers, in SEXUALLY COERCIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 5, at 199 (noting that the actuarial instruments for 
sexual recidivism were “based on a surprisingly small amount of empirical work”). 
 192. CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., AN OVERVIEW OF SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT 1, 2 
(2002), available at http://www.csom.org/pubs/csom_bro.pdf.  For several reasons this population should 
be excluded, including its being overwhelmingly characterized by psychiatric disorders (80%) and 
learning disabilities (30-60%).  CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MGMT., MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX 
OFFENDERS (2000), http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.html.  Moreover, there is no evidence to 
show that sexually abusive youth become sex offenders as adults.  AN OVERVIEW OF SEX OFFENDER 
MANAGEMENT, supra, at 2.  Unfortunately, this has not stopped the increasing treatment of juveniles 
as adults in the criminal justice system, where juvenile court waivers have become increasingly com-
mon, the age at which juveniles may be tried as adults has been lowered, and minimum age restrictions 
for trying juveniles as adults in certain serious crimes have been abandoned.  See id. at 4–6 (noting the 
increasing level of accountability in the criminal justice system). 
 193. LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, AN ANALYSIS 
OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS i, iii (1997), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/soo.pdf. 
 194. Id. at *vi; see also Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST. 
43, 52–53 (1998) (noting that about 1.5% of murders involve rape or sexual assault). 
 195. LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CHILD 
VICTIMIZERS: VIOLENT OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS iv (1996), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvvoatv.pdf (reporting “3 in 4 child victims of violence were fe-
male.”). 
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The base rate of sexual re-offending appears to be low, well below that of gen-
eral or even violent recidivism.196 
Very little is known about pedophilia in adult males.  Pedophiles seem to be 
an older crowd: nearly twenty-five percent of child victimizers are forty or 
older,197 although most recidivists are younger.198  Approximately thirty percent 
of all adult sex offenders were sexually abused as children.199  Although being 
exposed to physical violence in childhood predisposes adults to violence, it is 
unclear whether being exposed to sexual abuse in childhood has the same effect 
on sexual offending by adults.200 
Some potentially important physiological anomalies have been observed in 
pedophiles.  Right temporal lobe hypometabolism has been identified in adult 
pedophiles,201 as have lower baseline cortisol levels202 and monoaminergic dys-
function.203  Although pedophilia is not well studied, some researchers believe 
that neurological deficits, chromosome aberration, or early childhood abuse or 
sexual experience may imprint desire onto inappropriate outlets.204  The best 
available evidence suggests some disruption in the development of the neuro-
system.205 
 
 196. The exact numbers appear to be somewhat in dispute.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports 
that sexual offender recidivism is set at about five percent, and child molesters’ recidivism appears at 
about three percent.  BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL OFFENDER 
STATISTICS (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).  
However, the Center for Sex Offender Management reports that recidivism is set at a thirteen percent 
reconviction rate for child molesters and nineteen percent for rapists.  MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX 
OFFENDERS, supra note 192.  In either event, the “recidivism rates for sex offenders are lower than for 
the general criminal population.”  Id.; cf. Hanson et al., supra note 105, at 353 (finding that although 
recidivism rates for rapists and child molesters are about equal for sexual offenses, rapists are more 
likely to commit another violent act). 
 197. See CRIMINAL OFFENDER STATISTICS, supra  note 196. 
 198. Hanson et al., supra note 105, at 353. 
 199. MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS, supra note 192. 
 200. See, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR 
STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 54–55 (2001) (“Although [a child’s] prior physical 
abuse . . . [is] associated with post-discharge violence, prior sexual abuse was not.”); CTR. FOR SEX 
OFFENDER MGMT., UNDERSTANDING JUVENILE SEXUAL OFFENDING BEHAVIOR: EMERGING 
RESEARCH, TREATMENT APPROACHES AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (1999), available at 
http://www.csom.org/pubs/juvbrf10.html (reporting that twenty to fifty percent of sexually abusive 
youth had a history of physical abuse, while forty to eighty percent had a history of sexual abuse). 
 201. Mario F. Mendez et al., Pedophilia and Temporal Lobe Disturbances, 12 J. 
NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCI. 71, 71–76 (2000) (“A predisposition to pedophilia may 
be unmasked by hypersexuality from brain disease.”). 
 202. See Michael Maes et al., Lower Baseline Plasma Cortisol and Prolactin together with Increased 
Body Temperature and Higher mCPP-Induced Cortisol Responses in Men with Pedophilia, 24 
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 37, 37–44 (2001) (studying hormonal and serotonergic alterations in 
pedophiles). 
 203. See Kafka, supra note 190, at 91 (“[A] specific role for these neuromodulators in the paraphilic 
condition remains neither proven nor rejected.”). 
 204. See F. S. Berlin & E. Kraut, Pedophilia Diagnostic Concepts, Treatment and Ethical Considera-
tions, 7 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 13 (1986); F. S. Berlin et al., A 5-Year Follow-Up Survey of Crimi-
nal Recidivism, 12 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 5 (1991). 
 205. Berlin et al., supra note 204, at 208 (“[T]he best available evidence suggests that most sexual 
deviance and paraphilia is caused by very early biomedical events leading to neurodevelopmental dis-
ruption.”). 
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Violent behavior therefore appears to be both universal and individual—
both normal aggression gone awry and pathological breakdowns in biological 
systems, both nature and nurture.  Multiple hormones and neurotransmitters, 
and a multitude of genes, contribute to aggression, along with the social envi-
ronment, context, and timing.  Personality and genetics are undoubtedly in-
volved, as are social circumstances like status, future prospects, and relative 
wealth.  Violence is complex behavior.  Why would identifying the genetic con-
tributions not aid the accuracy of future dangerousness predictions? 
IV 
BEHAVIORAL GENETICS AND FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 
A. Assumptions about Human Nature 
The explosion of scientific information related to the determination of the 
human genome has created an unfortunate misunderstanding by many—
including scientists—of the role that genes play in behavior.206  The assumptions 
go something like this: Genes made us the way we are; therefore, we are driven 
by a set of rigid, genetically determined predilections towards some behaviors.  
The force of this genetic dictatorship makes us less responsible for our actions, 
mainly because genetic “determinism” is absolute and irreversible.  Such views 
are used to influence increasingly restrictive laws presumably aimed at curbing 
the worst in us.  How did we arrive at such a state?  Is this really true? 
A prime example of how such views came to be integrated into our assump-
tions, our “belief system,” is The Selfish Gene, by Richard Dawkins, which be-
came influential soon after being first published in 1976.207  Dawkins theorizes 
that “we, and all other animals, are machines created by our genes.”208  This 
prompts Dawkins to argue that a predominant quality in a “successful gene,” 
defined as one is passed on from generation to generation, is ruthless selfishness 
and that it will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behavior.  Dawkins 
essentially used the theory of natural selection proposed by Darwin as one po-
tential mechanism behind evolution and applied it to gene selection.  Presuma-
bly, genetic selection was simply too dry a subject on its own; it needed some 
pizzazz, and voilà, the dog-eat-dog process of natural selection was the ideal 
concept to muster interest.  The gene became “selfish” because it tends to per-
petuate itself; it became “ruthless” because it was in “competition” with its al-
leles.  Dawkins used this series of unsupported conclusions to argue further 
that, since genes can influence behavior (unsupported conclusion), we tend to-
 
 206. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 144, at 105 (“Genes do not directly cause behavior, since their 
effect is expressed indirectly through physiological systems.”).  Even if genetic correlations to violence 
are identified, “many individuals with abnormal genotypes will be completely normal.”  Id. at 126. 
 207. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (Oxford Univ. Press 1989) (1976). 
 208. Id. at 2. 
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ward selfish behavior (unsupported conclusion).  As usual, two wrongs do not 
make a right. 
Such unfortunate categorical language has led to great misunderstanding.  
Many readers, and some who never read the book at all, stopped at the inflam-
matory, basic theory that the “gene is the basic unit of selfishness”209 (unsup-
ported conclusion) and applied the concept to complex behaviors.  To the au-
thor’s credit (and in response to the uproar210), Dawkins tempered this extreme 
notion by arguing that, rather than being strictly deterministic, genes “deter-
mine” our behavior only in a statistical sense211 (adding another unsupported 
conclusion).  The author, considering—seemingly ineffectively—how easily this 
misunderstanding has been perpetuated, argued further that the effect of the 
gene depends on the environment, including other genes: “Sometimes a gene 
has one effect in the presence of a particular other gene, and a completely dif-
ferent effect in the presence of another set companion genes.”212  Although this 
position provides a glimpse into the precarious conditions mandating genetic 
expression, it still gives genes far too much power—power they do not have.  
There is no evidence to suggest that genes dictate behavior “in a statistical 
sense,” or otherwise. 
B. Nature vs. Nurture, Again 
One basic question regarding the development of the nervous system is how 
much influence genetic programming (nature) has compared to environmental 
factors (nurture).213  Only a few years ago, many believed it was the environment 
that made us who and what we are.214  Our parents were responsible for our 
neuroses; failed relationships and divorce were considered learned behaviors.  
Even the environment we lived in was blamed for our depression. 
Now the reigning mode of explaining development, individual differences, 
and even behavior is genetics.215  Nowadays, some believe—falsely—that there is 
a gene for this behavior and a gene for that behavior—that some genes make us 
violent, some make us depressed, and others make us gregarious.  Hopefully, 
though, it will become evident that the development of the brain relies on nei-
ther nature nor nurture, but on both.  In fact, the effect of environment—
nurture—is what makes individuals of a species different.  That is, the differ-
ences between rats, tigers, chimps, and humans can be explained by differences 
in their genetic makeup, but to explain the differences between two individual 
 
 209. Id. at 36. 
 210. E.g., MERLIN W. DONALD, A MIND SO RARE: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS 
4 (2001) (observing that deterministic theories of mind, such as those espoused by Dawkins, make 
“great inferential leaps from genes to culture and ignor[e] a good deal of what we know about the 
brain”). 
 211. Id. at 37–40. 
 212. Id. at 37. 
 213. See generally DAVID S. MOORE, THE DEPENDENT GENE 72 (2001). 
 214. RICHARD LEWONTIN, THE TRIPLE HELIX: GENE, ORGANISM, AND ENVIRONMENT 16 (1998). 
 215. Id. 
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chimps or two individual humans, more is needed than their genetic differ-
ences.216 
First, to put genes in perspective: Inside the nucleus of a cell is deoxyribonu-
cleic acid, or DNA, which is like two strings of pearls twisted around each other 
in a double helix.  Each string has four different types of pearls; the particular 
sequence of a number of pearls is a gene—a code used  for the manufacture of a 
protein,217  So DNA contains many, many genes, each of which codes for one or 
more proteins.  When activated, genes—pieces of DNA—make different kinds 
of proteins.218  Just as the DNA is like the blueprint for a building, the proteins 
are the building materials—brick, mortar, metal, and wood—that create a cell. 
But DNA is not two-dimensional like a blueprint; it is a linear chain of cod-
ing, a specific sequence of pearls.  And the organism whose information is en-
coded is three-dimensional.  Therefore, the cell actually created may resemble 
its blueprint only in principle.  A particular gene does not always code for a par-
ticular protein: although many genes appear to produce only one primary pro-
tein, other genes produce alternative forms of these proteins.219  These proteins 
may start or end at different sites along the coded region and may have more 
than one site for alternative splicing of proteins.  A single stretch of DNA may 
thus encode a variety of proteins.  Sometimes a cell may express these different 
proteins; in other cases, the pattern is subject to developmental regulation.  
That is, one gene can encode many different proteins, often with divergent 
functions.220  Environmental factors—environmental “noise”—may also play a 
role in cellular structure, just as a complex set of environmental circumstances, 
including the builder’s experience, the workers’ dedication, the terrain, the 
weather, the economy will affect the building’s integrity, despite its blueprint. 
The environment can alter, in turn, genetic expression.  For example, when 
water fleas, those little bugs that skip along the surface of water, are raised in a 
lab aquarium containing the scent of fish—their main predator—they will ex-
press a “helmet” that makes them harder to swallow.  When no scent of fish is 
present, water fleas with identical DNA will not express a helmet.221  Thus, the 
environment can elicit markedly different traits from the same DNA and a 
given genotype can develop in different ways, depending on the environment. 
Similarly, maternal care can change the expression of a gene in rats that 
makes them fearful and jumpy.  Rat pups regularly licked and groomed by their 
 
 216. Id. at 17.  Indeed, some believe that the organism is determined neither by its genes nor its en-
vironment, or the interactions between them, but that “developmental noise” introduces a random 
process that leads to great variation in individual differences.  Id. at 38. 
 217. See generally MOORE, supra note 213, at 67–81. 
 218. J.Z. YOUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF MAN 60 (1971). 
 219. BASIC NEUROCHEMISTRY: MOLECULAR, CELLULAR AND MEDICAL ASPECTS 421 (George J. 
Siegel et al. eds., Lippincott-Raven Pubs. 6th ed. 1999). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Lehman et al., A Hierarchical Molecular Phylogeny within the Genus Daphnia, 4 MOLECULAR 
PHYLOGENETICS & EVOLUTION 395, 395 (1995). 
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mothers instead grow up to be calm and curious.222  Closer to home, geneticists 
investigated the claim that a gene called 5-HTT is associated with depression 
and suicide.223  When people experience very stressful events, they found, those 
who carry this gene are more likely to suffer from depression than those with 
the “healthy” variant.224  The genes themselves are not connected to depression 
or aggression in the absence of exposure to environmental risk.  Again, differ-
ing environments can produce different traits from the same or a different geno-
type.  It may be that genes allow us a plasticity in responding to the environ-
ment, rather than hard-wiring our behavior.  What is innate, our human nature, 
is actually our flexibility to respond to a complex environment. 
C. Genes Make Proteins, Not Behavior 
Behavior is generated by and dependent upon a complex nervous system.  
Genes alone do not make behavior, they make proteins.  A collection of pro-
teins make a nerve cell, but it takes more than nerve cells alone to generate be-
havior.  Brain cells, once constructed, must be connected accurately into work-
ing circuits or systems, such as motor or visual systems.  Within each of these 
systems, every cell seeks its specific synaptic targets, other nerve cells with 
which they will synapse and communicate to create the working system.  If that 
search is thwarted, the cell may never find a target and will die.  This is the 
process of programmed cell death,225 
A pervasive and well-supported theory of brain development, programmed 
cell death describes the development of some systems in the brain as follows: 
The developing brain system makes about twice as many cells as it will end up 
with in the adult.226  Every distinct group of cells within that system must link up 
with its appropriate synaptic target (or targets) in order to create a circuit (or 
circuits) within that system.  The target for a specific group of cells expresses a 
specific growth factor, like a perfume that attracts only certain suitors, and the 
cells begins sending out axons—arm-like appendages—that pursue the chemical 
gradient of growth factor secreted by a target, growing towards it.  Those axons 
that reach the target first will feast on the growth factor, consolidating their 
synaptic link and keeping the cell of origin alive.  The axons of cells that arrived 
too late will find no site at which to synapse and be nurtured, and they will con-
sequently die. 
Programmed cell death—survival of the fastest—is very much like develop-
mental natural selection.  The process of establishing appropriate connections 
in many brain regions is essentially stochastic, and, as such, it is extremely vul-
 
 222. E.W. Fish et al., Epigenetic Programming of Stress Responses through Variations in Maternal 
Care, 1036 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 167, 167 (2004). 
 223. Avshalom Caspi et al., Influence of Life Stress on Depression: Moderation by a Polymorphism 
in the 5-HTT Gene, 301 SCI. 386, 386 (2003). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Robert R. Buss & Ronald W. Oppenheim, Role of Programmed Cell Death in Normal Neu-
ronal Development and Function, 79 ANATOMICAL SCI. INT’L. 191, 191 (2004). 
 226. See generally MOORE, supra note 213, at 82–103. 
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nerable to environmental conditions.  For example, if the environment of the 
fetus is disturbed during the time when the main links are being made—namely, 
during the first and second trimesters—abnormal connectivity may result.  If the 
neurochemical environment is changed dramatically, too few cortical cells may 
survive, as in oxygen compromise leading to mental retardation; or too many 
cells may survive, as in over-expression of growth factors, which may be the 
case in some schizophrenics.227  Between these extremes is the potential for a 
great number of milder effects on cell survival, none genetically determined, 
that may give rise to individual differences.  Even if all goes well and one group 
of cells connects appropriately with another, all the process creates is a very ba-
sic nervous system, one still incapable of “behavior.” 
Lots of different cells and several different systems interconnected in suffi-
ciently complex ways will lead to behavior, but to only simple behavior, as long 
as there is no environmental influence.  For example, imagine that we could 
grow a complex nervous system in the absence of an environment, or in a neu-
tral environment.228  Such a nervous system, no matter how complex, would 
carry out only simple behaviors.  It might eat, breathe, walk—basically it could 
survive and carry out presumably innate functions.  But without an appropriate 
environment, the nervous system will not be shaped appropriately and will not 
function normally.  It will not learn, remember, plan, or behave in socially ac-
ceptable (or unacceptable) ways.  An example of the pervasive effects of envi-
ronment is the classic sensory deprivation study of Melzack, in which puppies 
were brought up in the dark, without social interaction, amidst white noise and 
wearing collars to prevent grooming or contact with extremities.229  These dogs 
grew up to sniff an open flame without realizing their noses would burn and 
without reacting in pain.  When the study was repeated, however, the results 
could not be replicated.  One night, returning to the lab, Melzack found the rea-
son.  A cleaning person had felt sorry for the dogs and had released them from 
their collars and cages in the evening.  Such brief exposure to the environment 
was nevertheless enough to normalize complex behaviors. 
Not until all the brain systems are in place, coupled with exposure to an ap-
propriate environment, do we start “behaving” normally or abnormally.  Early 
in development, we learn to move, plan, and interact with others.  The combina-
tion of a good genetic program and the exposure to a proper environment cre-
ates a well-functioning nervous system. 
But even then, these behaviors are not written in stone.  We modify our 
brain connections throughout our lifetimes, usually in response to our surround-
 
 227. Edgar Garcia-Rill et al., Mesopontine Neurons in Schizophrenia, 66 NEUROSCIENCE 321, 321 
(1995). 
 228. This is strictly an intellectual exercise as there can be no organism without an environment, just 
as there can be no environment without an organism.  LEWONTIN, supra note 214, at 48. 
 229. Ronald Melzack & T. H. Scott, The Effects of Early Experience on the Response to Pain, 50 J. 
COMP. PHYSIOL. PSYCHOL. 155, 155–60 (1957).  Melzack’s procedures are unlikely to meet approval 
from regulatory committees today. 
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ings.  Some of these modifications are carried out by proteins, proteins that are 
coded by genes.  For example, consolidation of memories is believed to be 
caused by the triggering of genes to manufacture proteins that fortify a set of 
synapses so that when the circuit is activated, the memory may be recalled.230  
This means genes remain an active part of our everyday functions, of our be-
havior.  But what triggers the genetic expression is nerve activity as a result of 
interaction with the environment.  That is, such genes are at the beck and call of 
our now fully functioning nervous system; they are not dictating what the nerv-
ous system does, but they are tools our nerve cells use to mold the ever-
changing brain. 
Moreover, we are capable of changing our behavior as long as we live.  
What each of us ultimately becomes is influenced by multiple environmental 
factors at many points during our lifetime, from conception (microenviron-
ment) to birth and adulthood (macroenvironment). 
The sequence of events is that genes make proteins, which make cells, which 
make connections, which make systems, which make brains that are responsible 
for behavior.  In other words, the brain needs genes to create networks before it 
can realize its potential to control behavior.  At every point in this building and 
tuning process, the environment plays a hand, for better or for worse.  All traits, 
from biological traits like hair color and height to complex psychological traits 
like intelligence, are caused by complex interactions of genes and the environ-
ment. 
The overemphasis on molecular biology and genetic research has created 
the impression that it is the wave of the future, the answer to our medical and 
even our social illnesses.  But the methodology has its limits and it offers no 
reason to believe that safer or more economical ways of dealing with disease 
will emerge in many areas.  Some believe that the most fruitful research should 
be on diseases whose emergence and course cannot be significantly modified by 
personal habits or the environment.231  Disorders such as Type 1 diabetes and 
Alzheimer’s Disease appear to be induced by genetic mechanisms that cannot 
not be voluntarily or environmentally modified.  Yet Type 2 diabetes can be 
avoided by exercise and weight loss, alcohol consumption can be reduced by 
higher taxes and better oversight of sales, and nicotine addiction can be modi-
fied by smoking bans, social pressure, and taxes.  Environmental approaches 
are not as sexy as gene-based, high-tech methods, but they do work. 
Furthermore, the evidence proffered by genetic studies also offers reasons 
for caution.232  Studies associating genes with specific diseases are typically 
 
 230. Subimal Datta, Avoidance Task Training Potentiates Phasic Pontine-Wave Density in the Rat: A 
Mechanism for Sleep-Dependent Plasticity, 20 J. NEUROSCI. 8607, 8607–13 (2000). 
 231. Kathleen R. Merikangas & Neil Risch, Genomic Priorities and Public Health, 302 SCIENCE 599 
(2003). 
 232. See Thomas A. Trikalinos et al., Establishment of Genetic Associations for Complex Diseases is 
Independent of Early Study Findings, 12 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 762, 768 (2004) (“[E]vidence collec-
tion and comprehensive synthesis may be useful in probing genetic associations of complex diseases, 
but cautious interpretation is probably always warranted.”). 
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wrong.233  A 1992 study found, for example, that people with two copies of a do-
pamine D3 receptor have a risk for schizophrenia roughly two to four times 
higher than others.234  But a flood of follow-up studies found no statistically sig-
nificant link between the genes and the risk.235  Two recent studies noted that 
when a finding is first published linking a given gene with a complex disease, the 
likelihood that other studies will confirm the finding is roughly only one in 
three.236  Another recent report suggested the first publication identifying a con-
nection between genes and illness is usually spurious; if it is true, the association 
is exaggerated.237 
D. Brave New Mind 
Neo-Darwinian hardliners, scholars who share the uncompromising belief in 
the irrelevance of the conscious mind and the illusory nature of free will, argue 
that human nature, including the intellect itself, is fixed in genetic concrete.238  
According to these hardliners, we do not just have emotions, we have them for 
specific reasons; we do not just see, we parse the world in a particular fashion; 
we have built-in cognitive tools such as “cheater detectors,” which recognize 
people who do not give a good return on investment.  Under the hardliner view, 
these are all hard-wired capacities—complex and completely unconscious and 
automatic.239 
Merlin Donald argues that, on the contrary, the capacity for consciousness is 
our distinguishing trait, a trait that defines human nature.  The emergence of 
languages, symbols, many social institutions, and religions has all been driven 
by a felt need to extend the reach of human consciousness.  The conscious mind 
assembles memories and skills, supervising the processes that make culture pos-
 
 233. Jack Lucentini, Gene Association Studies Typically Wrong: Reproducible Gene-Disease Associ-
ates Are Few and Far Between, 18 THE SCIENTIST 20, 20 (2004). 
 234. M. A. Crocq et al., Association Between Schizophrenia and Homozygosity at the Dopamine D3 
Receptor Gene, 29 J. MED. GENETICS 858, 859 (1992). 
 235. Erik G. Jonsson et al., Meta-analysis of the Dopamine D3 Receptor Gene (DRD3) Ser9Gly 
Variant and Schizophrenia, 14 PSYCHIATRIC GENETICS 9, 9–11 (2004). 
 236. Kirk E. Lohmuller et al., Meta-analysis of Genetic Association Studies Supports a Contribution 
of Common Variants to Susceptibility to Common Disease, 33 NATURE GENETICS 177, 177 (2003); John 
P. A. Ioannidis et al., Replication Validity of Genetic Association Studies, 29 NATURE GENETICS 306, 
306–08 (2001). 
 237. See Lucentini, supra note 233, at 20 (discussing the poor reproducibility of studies linking genes 
to diseases and disease). 
 238. See DONALD, supra note 210, at 1–4 (referring to authors Daniel Dennett, Richard Dawkins, 
and Steven Pinker as “neo-Darwinian Hardliners”).  Donald coined the term “Brave New Mind” to 
describe the implications of a number of recent books on the nature of consciousness.  See id. at 1.  See 
also DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANINGS OF LIFE 
(1995); DAWKINS, supra note 207; STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF 
HUMAN NATURE (2002). 
 239. See DONALD, supra note 210, at 2 (“According to . . . [the hardliners’] scheme of things, all that 
prating religious nonsense about moral self-discipline, denying the flesh, turning the other check, gain-
ing control over one’s base desires, not coveting thy neighbor’s wife, and so on is bound to fail because 
it contradicts our biology.”). 
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sible.  Our capacity for consciousness is what makes us human and provides the 
biological basis for the generation of culture, including symbolic thought and 
language.240  Donald argues further that while many brains collectively and over 
time generated our culture, culture in turn is shaping our brains.241  “The nature 
and range of human conscious experience are no longer a biological given.”242  
Rather, human conscious experience depends on “a somewhat unpredictable 
interaction of brain and culture, whereby the processes of mind can be endlessly 
rewritten and rearranged by cultural forces.”243 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Despite an ocean of literature explaining the flaws of expert behavioral pre-
dictions, legislatures continue to attempt to include future dangerousness pre-
dictors in statutes.244  Courts, long aware that these predictions are tenuous at 
best, ignore their gatekeeping duties and admit future dangerousness predic-
tions into evidence.  Experts, whose training and professional literature excori-
ate such testimony, continue to make future dangerousness predictions.  Al-
though the eugenics experiment in social control has been long discredited, a 
skeptic might be forgiven for observing that it too was characterized by a fla-
grant disregard for the standards and methods of science, though many of its 
most prominent advocates, like those experts testifying to future dangerousness, 
were nominally scientists. 
The development of a rational set of laws requires that they be founded on 
sound evidence.  Implementation of laws through judicial decisions similarly re-
quires sound evidence.  The intellectual culture of today is one in which science, 
instead of literature or philosophy, takes center stage in the debate over human 
nature and the nature of the universe.245  But this does not mean that scientists 
are always right, that they have a lock on the truth.  Nor does it make them im-
mune from scientific critique.  “The danger to society is not merely that it 
should believe wrong things, though that is great enough; but that it should be-
come credulous, and lose the habit of testing things and inquiring into them; for 
then it must sink back into savagery.” 246 
 
 240. Id. at 8, 11. 
 241. Id. at 11. 
 242. Id. at 321. 
 243. Id. at 321–22 (“The human conscious process is a specialized adaptation for navigating the tur-
bulent waters of culture as well as the primary channel through which cultural influence can be trans-
mitted back to us.”). 
 244. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 36–37, 39–41. 
 245. The face-off between these two cultures has been supplanted by a “third culture.”  John 
Brockman was convincing in showing that it is scientists, not literary intellectuals, who have the most to 
say on the important questions facing mankind.  JOHN BROCKMAN, THE THIRD CULTURE 17 (1995). 
 246. Timothy J. Madigan, Introduction to W. K. CLIFFORD, THE ETHICS OF BELIEF AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 76 (1999). 
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There is no such thing as absolute truth, philosopher Karl Popper has pro-
posed; what science provides is a better and better approximation of the truth.247  
Popper advised that we not attempt to prove our theories correct, but attempt 
to prove them wrong, because only by passing repeated tests and being con-
stantly refined in the process, may our theories approach truth.248  Few scientists 
treat their pet theories so disdainfully.  Nonetheless, Popper’s philosophy 
formed the foundation for the Daubert decision, requiring judges to examine 
the validity of scientific testimony before admitting it in evidence.249 
Legislatures and judges are under enormous public pressure to solve the 
problem of violent (and sexually violent) crime.  Admitting the dubious testi-
mony of experts willing to testify that an individual poses a future danger to so-
ciety is an easy, but disingenuous, answer.  Unfortunately, another easy answer 
to the problem of crime control—finding a genetic basis for executing or lock-
ing up a violent individual and throwing away the key—is similarly unsupported 
by evidence.  Genetic determinism is simply unfounded when it comes to com-
plex behavior.  Rather, to reduce the level of violence in our society and help 
prevent those who committed acts of violence from repeating them, we need to 
develop more constructive methods of expression:250  whether one justifies the 
enforcement of social norms through a utilitarian calculus or by retributive 
principles, or by some hybrid combination of the two, science ought to inform 
the social, political, and legal debates about what violence is preventable and 
about what controls are likely to be effective. 
Law’s moral authority is based on the accuracy of its assumptions and pre-
dictions.  Admitting scientifically baseless expert testimony on future danger-
ousness into evidence is not only cynical, it undermines law’s moral authority.  
The very least we can do in a system that aspires to do justice is to be sure the 
scientific testimony admitted in our courts has been tested, scrutinized, and 
properly limited.  If what we seek is justice, and if justice depends on the will-
ingness to seek the truth, the current charade undermines the rule of law.  A far 
better solution is to require that experts testifying about human behavior ac-
knowledge the complexity of the environmental (nurture) and biological  (na-
 
 247. KARL R. POPPER, REALISM AND THE AIM OF SCIENCE 25 (W.W. Bartley, III ed., 1983). 
 248. Id. 
 249. Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, The Law and the Brain: Judging Scientific Evidence 
of Intent, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 243, 247 (1999). 
 250. As Owen Jones noted, “law is a lever for moving human behavior.”  Owen D. Jones, Law and 
Biology: Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 167, 167 
(1997).  We ought to be fairly sure we are moving it in the right direction.  There is a great need for re-
search into early childhood intervention and for methods that are effective in rehabilitating offenders, 
methods that will certainly need to be individually tailored depending on the individual’s major nega-
tive environmental influences.  Such methods will certainly be criticized as expensive and time-
consuming, which they will be.  The cost of treatment and intensive supervision in the community is es-
timated at about $5,000-15,000 per individual per year; the cost of incarceration is significantly higher, 
$22,000 per year, excluding treatment costs.  See MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS, supra 
note 192.  What we are doing now is expensive in money and human capital too.  The question then be-
comes, how long are we willing to stand current conditions? 
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ture) interactions, and ultimately recognize that human beings can and do 
change their behavior. 
 
